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Federalism, Convergence, and Divergence 
in Constitutional Property 
GERALD S. DICKINSON* 
Federal law exerts a gravitational force on state actors, 
resulting in widespread conformity to federal law and doc-
trine at the state level. This has been well recognized in the 
literature, but scholars have paid little attention to this phe-
nomenon in the context of constitutional property. Tradition-
ally, state takings jurisprudence—in both eminent domain 
and regulatory takings—has strongly gravitated towards the 
Supreme Court’s takings doctrine. This long history of fed-
eral-state convergence, however, was disrupted by the 
Court’s controversial public use decision in Kelo v. City of 
New London. In the wake of Kelo, states resisted the Court’s 
validation of the economic development justification for 
public use, instead choosing to impose expansive private 
property protections beyond the federal minima. This re-
sistance thus raises a fundamental puzzle: despite the frac-
turing of public use doctrine following Kelo, states continue 
to converge around the force of and be lured by the Court’s 
regulatory takings jurisprudence. Why is this? This Article 
argues that the most persuasive explanation is the political 
economy; that is, where homeowners are perceived to be un-
derprotected by Supreme Court decisions, state actors are 
more likely to diverge from federal doctrine to grant greater 
                                                                                                                            
 *  Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. This 
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protections as opposed to when the challenger is a devel-
oper-landowner. The Court has not underprotected a home-
owner in a regulatory takings challenge in a manner that 
would spark a similar post-Kelo state resistance. Few schol-
ars have explored this mystery and offered conceptual and 
doctrinal explanations on the value of state divergence from 
federal takings doctrine in our federalist regime. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 The American system of federalism has created a phenomenon 
known as “the gravitational force of federal law.”1 This phenome-
non influences state actors to behave in ways that usually conform 
to, rather than diverge from, Supreme Court jurisprudence.2 Many 
state legislatures have enacted statutes that mimic congressional 
acts.3 Further, state constitutions imitate the federal Constitution,4 
and state courts regularly decide cases by following Supreme Court 
precedent.5 Even the Supreme Court’s interpretive methodology of 
statutory and constitutional provisions has been reproduced into 
state laws and constitutions.6 These methodologies deeply influence 
                                                                                                                            
 1  Scott Dodson, The Gravitational Force of Federal Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 
703, 725–26 (2016) (explaining that state courts have a tendency to decide issues 
of state law by mimicking federal court interpretations of analogous federal law). 
 2  In this Article, I refer to state actors as state legislatures and state courts. 
 3  See infra Section I.A. 
 4  State constitutions do, of course, differ from the federal Constitution in 
many ways. State constitutions, unlike their federal counterpart, are often far more 
detailed, and include quite a bit of policy-related provisions that the federal Con-
stitution ignores, such as public education and family law. Still, state constitutions 
include fundamental rights and the core amendments of the federal Constitution. 
See generally JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A JU-
RISPRUDENCE OF FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM (2005); Frank P. Grad, The 
State Constitution: Its Function and Form for Our Time, 54 VA. L. REV. 928 
(1968); Justin Long, Intermittent State Constitutionalism, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 41 
(2006); Jim Rossi, The Puzzle of State Constitutions, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 211 (2006) 
(reviewing GARDNER, supra); Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American Consti-
tutional Exceptionalism Revisited, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1641 (2014).  
 5  See Dodson, supra note 1, at 711–19.  
 6  See Alex B. Long, “If the Train Should Jump the Track . . .”: Divergent 
Interpretations of State and Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes, 40 GA. 
L. REV. 469, 478 (2006) (examining state interpretation of “borrowed” federal 
employment statutes).  
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state court decision-making frameworks and tiers of scrutiny in con-
stitutional jurisprudence.7  
Although this much is relatively well known,  scholars have paid 
little attention to this phenomenon in the context of constitutional 
property.8 States prefer to follow, rather than diverge from, the Su-
preme Court’s takings jurisprudence.9 This Article offers empirical 
evidence to suggest that this phenomenon exists within both veins 
of the Takings Clause10—regulatory takings and eminent domain.11 
For example, the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence, 
with all its imperfections, seems to lure states into its doctrinal orbit. 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon was the catalyst for state courts’ 
                                                                                                                            
 7  See Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology 
as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE. L.J. 1898, 1915–16 (2011).  
 8  James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, An Empirical Study of Implicit Takings, 
58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 35, 35 (2016). 
 9  See infra Section II.A. 
 10  U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides “nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” Id. 
 11  This Article’s inquiry focuses primarily on some state appellate court rul-
ings, but mostly state supreme court rulings on regulatory takings and eminent 
domain challenges, to substantiate the claim that conformity to federal takings 
doctrine is the rule, and that Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) is 
a rare exception in constitutional property that caused states to diverge from 
longstanding Supreme Court public use jurisprudence. See Krier & Sterk, supra 
note 8, at 39 (2016) (finding that “in certain circumstances state courts tend to 
provide less protection to private property than Supreme Court doctrine requires, 
though they, and some state legislatures, occasionally provide more”); infra Part 
II. There are several other cautionary observations to note in this Article. Many 
cases are never appealed to state appellate courts. See Thomas W. Merrill, The 
Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 94 n.105 (1986); see also 
George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (1984) (noting that surveys show that between 0.09% and 
0.2% of claims are pursued through appeal). I focus on eminent domain chal-
lenges regarding public use since Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) from 
1954 to 2017 and regulatory taking challenges since Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) from 1922 to 2017. Admittedly, this is not an ex-
haustive empirical study of regulatory takings or “implicit takings” of the kind 
that Krier and Sterk conducted. See Krier & Sterk, supra note 8, at 50. 
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embrace of Justice Holmes’s doctrinal prescription for overly bur-
densome regulations.12 Later takings rulings from the Court com-
pounded the complexity of the doctrine.13 Still, state actors have pre-
ferred to follow14 the doctrinal script like a thematic play that only 
seems to get more confusing with each passing Supreme Court 
term.15 Likewise, the public use vein of the Takings Clause has also 
had a preeminent influence over state actors.16 The Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Berman v. Parker defined the modern-day takings doctrine; 
it gave broad discretion to local governments to take private prop-
erty for almost any conceivable public use.17 The Court followed 
years later with Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, which af-
                                                                                                                            
 12  260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); see Robert Brauneis, “The Foundation of Our 
‘Regulatory Takings’ Jurisprudence”: The Myth and Meaning of Justice 
Holmes’s Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613, 615–
16 (1996). 
 13  See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1064 (1992) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (stating that barring a landowner from constructing habitable struc-
tures on land after the landowner purchased it can constitute a taking because it 
“denies [the landowner] economically viable use of [the] land” (quoting Agins v. 
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), abrogated by Lingle v. Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 532 (2005))); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan 
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982) (holding that statute allowing a cable 
company to place permanent cable facilities on landowner’s property constitutes 
a taking because it is “a permanent physical occupation of property”); Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 136–38 (1978) (holding that des-
ignating landowners’ train station as a historical landmark is not a taking because 
it “does not interfere in any way with the [land’s] present uses” or prevent land-
owner from “obtain[ing] a ‘reasonable return’ on its investment”).  
 14  See infra Part II. 
 15  Richard A. Epstein, Disappointed Expectations: How the Supreme Court 
Failed to Clean up Takings Law in Murr v. Wisconsin, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 
151, 154 (2017) (noting that “with each new doctrinal tweak, the level of gloom 
and confusion only increases as the Justices struggle to fit each new piece of the 
puzzle into a framework that has become less tidy and less satisfactory with each 
new iteration”).  
 16  See infra Part II. 
 17  348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (“[T]he legislature, not the judiciary, is the main 
guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation . . . .”). 
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firmed and strengthened its deferential treatment of physical sei-
zures.18 State actors have rarely resisted or diverted from the doctri-
nal rubrics offered by the Supreme Court.19  
This Article offers new insight into federalist dimensions in tak-
ings jurisprudence by exploring why this omnipotent convergence 
of state actors to federal takings doctrine exists. Part of the narrative 
of conformity is that the Court’s takings doctrine, like other areas of 
constitutional law, sets the constitutional baseline.20 But takings 
doctrine, unlike other areas of constitutional law, measures the con-
stitutional bottom against the background of state property law.21 
Thus, at a minimum, all state takings law presumably starts at the 
bottom and may, if state actors choose, go below the floor (few have 
done this),22 raise the ceiling, or conform to the existing baseline.23 
States are not preemptively bound by or tied to the Court’s constitu-
tional floor.24 The Supreme Court expressly offers states “extraordi-
nary latitude” in implementing law and defining and developing 
doctrine that goes above and beyond the baseline.25 States are by no 
means coerced into cautious legislative and judicial behavior.26 
                                                                                                                            
 18  467 U.S. 229, 239–42 (1984). 
 19  See infra Part II. 
 20  Id. 
 21  Krier & Sterk, supra note 8, at 38; Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimen-
sion of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203, 206 (2004).  
 22  See Krier & Sterk, supra note 8, at 39 (noting that “[o]ur review indicates 
that in certain circumstances state courts tend to provide less protection to private 
property than Supreme Court doctrine requires, though they, and some state leg-
islatures, occasionally provide more”). However, it should be noted that choosing 
to go below the floor of protections set by the Supreme Court is constitutionally 
impermissible. See Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State 
Courts in the Twenty-First Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 335, 357 (2002). Yet, as Krier 
and Sterk explain, some state courts regularly “reflect ignorance of—or indiffer-
ence to—Supreme Court teachings, which in any event place virtually no signifi-
cant constraints on state activities regarding property.” Krier & Sterk, supra note 
8, at 39.  
 23  See infra Part I.  
 24  See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458–59 (1991) (explaining that the 
Framers contemplated “a healthy balance of power between the States and the 
Federal Government”).  
 25  Krier & Sterk, supra note 8, at 50. 
 26  See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (“[B]ecause the 
States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed 
that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action.”). 
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Nevertheless, while state actors may divert from federal takings doc-
trine by providing more or less protections to landowners, many do 
not.27  
Instead, many state courts seem to take the safest route to dispo-
sitions by evaluating state takings actions using the interpretive 
methodologies and tests set forth by the Supreme Court, but decline 
to provide protections above the federal minima.28 Meanwhile, leg-
islatures craft state takings statutes in conformity with the Court’s 
constitutional commands.29 In other words, it is one thing for states 
to copy and paste federal takings provisions into state constitutions 
or to mimic the Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence by applying 
it to state takings provisions. It is another for state takings legislation 
to decline to enact laws that offer more private property protections 
to landowners and for state courts to rarely apply the Court’s doctri-
nal tests in a manner that expands protections to landowners.30  
This Article is equally concerned with a rare schism in the 
longstanding conformity in public use doctrine at the state level. 
Kelo v. City of New London is the notable exception where state di-
vergence from this longstanding gravitational conformity caused a 
rift in constitutional property immediately following the Supreme 
Court’s ruling. It is in Kelo that we find state conformity to takings 
doctrine to rupture along the public use line of the doctrine, as op-
posed to regulatory takings.31 The ruling famously triggered a wide-
spread political and judicial backlash.32 This centrifugal episode 
marked a distinct moment in constitutional property. The majority 
                                                                                                                            
 27  See infra Part II. 
 28  Id. 
 29  Id. 
 30  See Krier & Sterk, supra note 8, at 39. 
 31  See infra Section II.B.  
 32  There is no need to revisit the backlash in state legislatures and state courts 
here, as Ilya Somin has already provided excellent coverage of the ongoing de-
velopments since the Kelo decision. See generally Ilya Somin, Controlling the 
Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings After Kelo, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. 
REV. 183, 254 n.373 (2007) [hereinafter Somin, Grasping Hand]; Ilya Somin, Is 
Post-Kelo Eminent Domain Reform Bad for the Poor?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. COL-
LOQUY 195, 196–200 (2007) [hereinafter Somin, Post-Kelo Reform]; Ilya Somin, 
The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. 
REV. 2100, 2108–54 (2009) [hereinafter Somin, Limits of Backlash]. 
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of states concluded that the Supreme Court got it wrong,33 that eco-
nomic development justifications for eminent domain underpro-
tected landowners,34 specifically homeowners, and that the Court 
applied its jurisprudence “without the slightest nod to [the] original 
meaning [of the Takings Clause],” as Justice Thomas put it.35 Such 
widespread resistance was followed by a string of state supreme 
court rulings, along with state constitutional amendments, banning 
or limiting economic development takings, effectively announcing 
widespread state resistance to federal takings law.36 Indeed, we ar-
rive at this unusual episode of divergence in light of decades of con-
formity to federal takings doctrine. Prior to Kelo, there were few 
instances where states specifically granted greater protections to pri-
vate property beyond the “constitutional bottom” constructed by the 
Supreme Court and contemplated in the Takings Clause.37  
This rare instance of divergence raises a fundamental puzzle:  
despite the fracturing of public use doctrine following Kelo, states 
continue to converge around the gravitational force of the Supreme 
Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence.38 Nothing in the Kelo de-
cision spurred state legislatures nor state courts to revisit their regu-
latory takings legislation and doctrine.39 Given Kelo was a physical 
seizure and not a regulatory taking,40 this legislative inaction is not 
surprising, but it is still telling. Why has convergence in regulatory 
takings doctrine continued despite massive resistance in public use? 
The chaotic fissure in constitutional property created by the Kelo 
decision offers an opportunity to sketch some of the reasons and ex-
planations for the abrupt divergence. Indeed, some preliminary ex-
planations abound.41 
                                                                                                                            
 33  See Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra note 32, at 2101–02 (“[F]orty-three 
states have enacted post-Kelo reform legislation to curb eminent domain.”). 
 34  Somin, Grasping Hand, supra note 32, at 223 (noting “the unpopularity of 
economic development takings”). 
 35  Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 36  See Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra note 32, at 2114–54. 
 37  John Ferejohn & Barry Friedman, Toward a Political Theory of Constitu-
tional Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 825, 853 (2006) (noting that Supreme 
Court prescriptions create a constitutional bottom that leaves room for more 
rights-protective action by the states). 
 38  See infra Part II.  
 39  See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477–90. 
 40  Id. at 475–76. 
 41  See infra Section III.B. 
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Might it be that states, like those lured by the Court’s Berman 
and Mahon rulings, were simply influenced (or swept up) by coun-
tervailing waves of resistance in the moment?42 Or perhaps it is just 
a question of legislative loyalty and state court deference to the 
many amendments by legislatures that restricted or banned eco-
nomic development takings.43  It could also be state actors prefer-
ence for horizontal uniformity over vertical uniformity in the public 
use vein to give the impression of institutional legitimacy in takings 
doctrine.44 Similarly, one argument is that the divergence post-Kelo 
was a nod to state and local institutional competence to deal with 
questions of public use rather than federal actors.45  
This Article argues that the most persuasive explanation, how-
ever, is that the divergence and convergence dichotomy post-Kelo 
boils down to the political economy.46 That is, where homeowners 
are perceived to be underprotected by Supreme Court decisions, 
such as Ms. Kelo from the Kelo decision, states may be more likely 
to diverge from federal doctrine to grant greater protections as op-
posed to when the plaintiff is a developer-landowner in a regulatory 
takings challenge.  
Indeed, a lack of protections to the “home” has caused, at least 
in the post-Kelo era, divergence, while failure to vindicate other 
property interests maintains conformity at the state level.47 This 
yields a dichotomy in the gravitational force of federal constitutional 
property between strong conceptions of “core” property rights for 
homeowners and lesser protections from regulation for commercial 
developers or owners of undeveloped land.48 It is unlikely that states 
will engage in a countervailing resistance movement against federal 
regulatory takings doctrine without a seismic ruling by the Supreme 
                                                                                                                            
 42  Id. 
 43  Id. 
 44  Id. 
 45  Id. 
 46  Id. To the best of my knowledge, this Article is the first to argue that polit-
ical economy is the defining explanation for the state divergence that has subse-
quently led to a schism between regulatory takings doctrine and public use doc-
trine in constitutional property post-Kelo. 
 47  See infra Section II.B.4. 
 48  Id. 
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Court that upholds a regulation that underprotects a plaintiff home-
owner.  
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I explains the concept 
of the gravitational force of federal law to provide a framework and 
some background on the influence that federal law has on the states.   
Part II explores the empirical evidence of whether Supreme 
Court takings doctrine lures states into its orbit.  The answer is yes, 
for the most part. State actors have responded to the Court’s regula-
tory takings and public use doctrine since Berman and Mahon by 
generally following the Court’s jurisprudential commands. But, this 
Part also unpacks one notable exception—a rupture of sorts—in the 
longstanding convergence in takings that occurred after the Kelo rul-
ing. The ruling and subsequent nationwide backlash raises a unique 
dichotomy in constitutional property, where states have shown a 
willingness to diverge from the Court’s public use doctrine, but slav-
ishly continue to follow its regulatory takings vein.49 This Part also 
explains that the political economy—perceived underprotection of 
homeowners—is most likely the reason for divergence in public use 
post-Kelo.  
Part III offers additional conceptual and doctrinal explanations 
for why state courts tend to follow the Court’s takings jurisprudence 
when that is by no means required. Part III also offers alternative 
explanations beyond political economy for why the Kelo ruling 
caused one of the great state departures from federal doctrine in con-
stitutional law. 
Part IV unpacks normative implications for the contemporary 
disequilibrium between regulatory takings and public use doctrine 
at the state level. Many areas of constitutional law have experienced 
some variation of convergence and divergence amongst the states.50 
Yet, the breadth and depth of the divergence after the Kelo decision 
separates constitutional property from other areas of constitutional 
law. While scholars have debated the merits of the Kelo decision 
and weighed the ruling’s doctrinal and historical implications,51 
                                                                                                                            
 49  Cf. Dodson, supra note 1, at 726 (“But, for the most part, state courts con-
strue their own state constitutional protections in lockstep with the Supereme 
Court’s interpretation of analogous federal provisions, slavishly incorporating the 
Supreme Court’s doctrinal standards and buzzwords.”).  
 50  See infra Section II.B. 
 51  See, e.g., Krier & Sterk, supra note 8, at 35; Somin, Grasping Hand, supra 
note 32; Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra note 32. 
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none has ever offered explanations for both the convergence and the 
unusually chaotic episode of post-Kelo divergence that reveals such 
a stark disequilibrium in constitutional property. This Article con-
cludes that more divergence of the sort witnessed post-Kelo, espe-
cially in the regulatory takings vein, is healthy for federalism and 
may be more appropriate in areas of constitutional property than 
other veins of constitutional law given the strong theme of back-
ground state laws. 
I. GRAVITATIONAL FORCE OF FEDERAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
A. Federal Statutes and State Following 
Federal law exerts a certain force that lures states into governing, 
regulating, and administering laws using federal law as the blue-
print.52 This gravitational pull has a peculiar influence over state 
constitutional law and state legislative enactments, particularly 
where obedience is not compelled or required by Congress or the 
Supreme Court.53 It is a pervasive force that extends to both proce-
dural and substantive state law.54 While states, as sovereigns, may 
experiment and exercise independence in constitutionalism, they 
have seemed timid and cautious in exercising their latitude to divert 
from federal pronouncements, and often times simply comply with 
federal law, even when it is not mandated.55 Scholars have offered 
competing explanations for uniformity and convergence in federal 
and constitutional law.56 Constitutional autonomy, once promoted 
                                                                                                                            
 52  See Dodson, supra note 1, at 705.  
 53  Id.  
 54  See id. at 707–29.  
 55  Id. at 725 (citing James A. Gardner, Autonomy and Isomorphism: The Un-
fulfilled Promise of Structural Autonomy in American State Constitutions, 60 
WAYNE L. REV. 31, 34 (2014) (noting that the United States Constitution and state 
constitutions “tend to converge strongly”)). 
 56  See id. at 729–30 (“The most benign explanation is that federal law gets 
the law right first, and state actors, realizing this, follow as a matter of agreement 
and judgment. . . . [But,] explanations for state isomorphism generally, and in 
specific instances, need deeper theorizing.”).  
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by the likes of Justice Louis Brandeis57 and Justice William Bren-
nan,58 simply has not materialized.59  
Federal employment discrimination laws are a primary example. 
They tend to generate state behavior that cautiously mimics inter-
pretive methodologies for federal statutory law and federal case 
law.60 Soon after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title 
VII”) was enacted, “all . . . states that previously lacked antidiscrim-
ination statutes adopted them,”61 thus setting the stage for federal 
law to become the standard-bearer “for individual rights in the em-
ployment context, with state legislatures and courts taking their cues 
from federal law.”62 The passage of these laws caused states to en-
gage in a high level of mimicry by enacting substantially similar 
laws that imitated the provisions of Title VII, the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act (“ADEA”), and the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act (“ADA”).63 There are also examples of how states have 
mimicked federal procedural laws. For example, the adoption of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 “wrenched the states off 
their traditional courses” to either mirror or mimic the federal 
rules.64 The Federal Rules of Evidence, likewise, also permeate 
throughout the states.65  
Indeed, where legislation is similarly drafted, state courts tend 
to interpret state legislation along the same lines as federal courts.66 
In fact, some state legislation “require[s] conforming interpretation 
                                                                                                                            
 57  See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 440–21 (1922) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
 58  See William J. Brennan, Jr. State Constitutions and the Protection of Indi-
vidual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977) [hereinafter Brennan, State Con-
stitutions]. 
 59  Dodson, supra note 1, at 725. 
 60  Scholars have explored this federal-state relationship. Id. at 720 n.79 (cit-
ing Long, supra note 6; Sandra F. Sperino, Revitalizing State Employment Dis-
crimination Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 545 (2013)).  
 61  Sally F. Goldfarb, The Supreme Court, the Violence Against Women Act, 
and the Use and Abuse of Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 91 (2002). 
 62  Long, supra note 6, at 478.  
 63  Id. at 424–25. 
 64  Dodson, supra note 1, at 710. 
 65  See 6 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FED-
ERAL EVIDENCE, at T-1 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2015). 
 66  See Dodson, supra note 1, at 721 (citing Long, supra note 6, at 473).  
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with federal precedent.”67 As Scott Dodson notes, “state courts typ-
ically conform to federal court interpretations of federal statutes 
with relatively paltry analysis of countervailing considerations.”68 
And, as Alex Long mentions, “state courts sometimes appear to 
bend over backwards in construing state antidiscrimination statutes 
in order to keep state and federal law on the same track.”69 Even 
when the language and text of state legislation is different from fed-
eral statutes, states tend to “finesse the textual differences where 
they exist.”70 However, this phenomenon is not universal or uniform 
across the board. There are plenty of examples of states diverging 
from federal law.71 Some states, for instance, provide greater pro-
tections to employees claiming discrimination.72 From a methodo-
logical standpoint, a number of state appellate courts have declined 
to follow federal court interpretations of employment discrimination 
statutes when interpreting identical state statutes.73 Indeed, while 
there is significant conformity, it is prudent to note that there does 
not exist wholesale conformity across the spectrum of federal and 
state law. There are exceptions, but on the whole scholars have 
found substantial convergence between federal doctrine and legisla-
tion at the state level. 
                                                                                                                            
 67  Dodson, supra note 1, at 721 n.87 (emphasis added) (citing Long, supra 
note 6, at 477).  
 68  Dodson, supra note 1, at 721 (citing Long, supra note 6, at 477).  
 69  Long, supra note 6, at 477; see also Dodson, supra note 1, at 722–23 (dis-
cussing the doctrinal nuances of state conformity to federal courts’ interpretations 
of antidiscrimination doctrine).  
 70  Long, supra note 6, at 495.  
 71  Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Fed-
eralism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1988) (identifying many 
federal programs that have origins at a state level); Myron T. Steele & Peter I. 
Tsoflias, Realigning the Constitutional Pendulum, 77 ALB. L. REV. 1365, 1375 
(2015) (identifying and discussing states with broader constitutional protections 
of civil liberties, including free speech and privacy rights); Benjamin J. Beaton, 
Note, Walking the Federalist Tightrope: A National Policy of State Experimenta-
tion for Health Information Technology, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1670, 1688–93 
(2008) (explaining the development of health information technology policy at 
the state level where federal action had been lacking).  
 72  See Goldfarb, supra note 61, at 91.  
 73  See Long, supra note 6, at 473–74.  
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B. The Federal Constitution and State Constitutionalism  
Federal constitutional law also emits a certain preeminent influ-
ence over state constitutions and state court interpretations of federal 
doctrine.74 This has been a bit puzzling to some scholars.75 Almost 
every state has an equal protection clause that is analyzed using the 
same levels of scrutiny that the Supreme Court has developed to an-
alyze the federal Equal Protection Clause.76 Some state supreme 
courts simply do not distinguish between state and federal constitu-
tions in their analysis of the guarantee of freedom of speech.77 Thus, 
the First Amendment analytical framework provided by the Su-
preme Court provides the backbone standards against which state 
and local enactments are to be measured.78  
In the 1990s, several scholars explored whether state doctrine 
complied with federal doctrine and the interpretive methodologies 
of the United States Supreme Court.79 These scholars found that 
state courts had been “engag[ing] in an analysis in lockstep with 
their federal counterparts,”80 except in the areas of free exercise of 
religion, right to trial by jury, and search and seizure.81 In these three 
areas, more than half of the state court rulings departed from tradi-
tional convergence, and instead chose to grant greater protections to 
certain rights.82 In other words, the majority of state courts, on most 
                                                                                                                            
 74  Dodson, supra note 1, at 724.  
 75  See, e.g., id. 
 76  See id. at 726. There are, however, some “pockets of state independ-
ence, . . . such as discrete areas of constitutional criminal law.” Id. 
 77  See, e.g., Pick v. Nelson, 528 N.W.2d 309, 317 (Neb. 1995) (“[W]e do not 
distinguish between the two constitutions in our analysis of this issue.”). 
 78  Sterk, supra note 21, at 206.  
 79  Solimine, supra note 22, at 338.  
 80 Id.; see also James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitu-
tionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 766 (1992) [hereinafter Gardner, Failed Dis-
course]; Barry Latzer, The Hidden Conservatism of the State Court “Revolution,” 
74 JUDICATURE 190, 190 (1991). 
 81  Solimine, supra note 22, at 338–39. 
 82  James N.G. Cauthen, Expanding Rights Under State Constitutions: A 
Quantitative Appraisal, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1183, 1196 (2000). The study examined 
627 state supreme court decisions chosen from a randomized selection of states 
that covered states’ Bills of Rights in nineteen issue areas. Id. at 1191–94. But, 
criminal procedure is one area where there is divergence with federal law. See 
David C. Brody, Criminal Procedure Under State Law: An Empirical Examina-
tion of Selective New Federalism, 23 JUST. SYS. J. 75, 79 (2002) (finding that that 
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issues, engaged in an analysis that was the same or substantially 
similar to their federal counterparts.83 Michael Solimine notes that 
“when presented with the opportunity, [state courts] have chosen not 
to depart from federal precedents when interpreting the rights-grant-
ing provisions of state constitutions.”84 Invariably, the American 
federalist system has allowed the Supreme Court’s interpretations of 
the Constitution to have an “overwhelming gravitational pull” on 
state decisions.85 One reason for this overwhelming magnetic force 
is that federal law “has a degree of visibility and persuasiveness that 
state law lacks.”86  
There are, however, other areas of the law in which states and 
state courts have diverged from Supreme Court jurisprudence. For 
example, prior to the series of Supreme Court cases legalizing same-
sex marriage, a number of states diverged from the long-standing 
federal restrictions on gay rights.87 Additionally, the Fourth Amend-
ment’s exclusionary rule differs from federal law among some 
states.88 These exceptions provide a caveat throughout this Article: 
the gravitational force does not influence every state in all areas of 
state law. Nonetheless, the depth of state conformity to congres-
sional acts and Supreme Court doctrine is noteworthy and deserves 
                                                                                                                            
the laws of forty-one states provided greater protection than federal law in at least 
one area, while four states provided greater protection in nine areas). 
 83  Cauthen, supra note 82, at 1194–96.  
 84  Solimine, supra note 22, at 338 (emphasis in original).  
 85  See ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
185 (2009).  
 86  See Dodson, supra note 1, at 739 n.197 (quoting Goldfarb, supra note 61, 
at 92). 
 87  Dodson, supra note 1, at 741–42; see, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 
68 (Haw. 1993) (finding gay marriage restrictions presumptively unconstitutional 
under the Hawaii constitution); Goodridge v. Mass. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 
N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003) (finding limitations of civil marriage to individuals 
of opposite sexes lacked rational basis and violated state constitutional equal pro-
tection principles); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 889 (Vt. 1999) (finding exclu-
sion of same-sex couples from benefits and protections incident to marriage under 
state law violated common benefits clause of State Constitution). 
 88  See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651–52 (1961); Dodson, supra note 1, at 
744 n.237. 
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greater exploration in other areas of constitutional law, such as tak-
ings law.89 
One might assume that given the structural and governmental 
differences between the federal Constitution and the state constitu-
tions, as well as the sensitive policy matters reviewed by state su-
preme courts, “states should exercise independence in state consti-
tutionalism.”90 But the gravitational force to which Dodson, Long, 
Goldfarb, Williams, and Solimine speak still results in a judicial cul-
ture of “go with the flow unless some countervailing force enables 
resistance.”91 This has produced a phenomenon where state consti-
tutions are being interpreted to mimic Supreme Court interpretations 
of the federal Constitution, leading to the adoption and application 
of the Court’s interpretive methodologies.92 The concern, of course, 
is that such blind following might have the effect of confusing in-
terpretations of the analogous state constitutional provision.93 
Indeed, independent state constitutionalism, for which Justice 
William Brennan once advocated,94 arguably failed to materialize. 
The tendency is for state constitutions and state constitutional law 
to converge with the language and body of the federal Constitution 
and Supreme Court jurisprudence.95 This is partially a result of the 
“often unstated premise that U.S. Supreme [C]ourt interpretations of 
the federal Bill of Rights are presumptively correct for interpreting 
analogous state provisions.”96 Even if the state constitutional provi-
sion is different from the federal one, states tend to apply the Su-
preme Court’s doctrinal scripts,97 largely because state bills of rights 
                                                                                                                            
 89  See infra Part II for a discussion of state conformity to federal takings doc-
trine.  
 90  See Dodson, supra note 1, at 725. 
 91  Id. at 727; see WILLIAMS, supra note 85; Goldfarb, supra note 61; Long, 
supra note 6; Solimine, supra note 22. 
 92  Solimine, supra note 22, at 338.  
 93  WILLIAMS, supra note 85, at 151–52 .  
 94  See Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 58, at 420–21. 
 95  Gardner, Failed Discourse, supra note 80, at 764–66; see also Lawrence 
Friedman, Path Dependence and the External Constraints on Independent State 
Constitutionalism, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 783, 783–84 (2011).  
 96  WILLIAMS, supra note 85, at 135 (arguing that this premise is wrong); see 
also Dodson, supra note 1, at 724–26 (arguing that states should exercise inde-
pendence in interpreting their constitutional provisions). 
 97  GARDNER, supra note 4, at 6–7; Gardner, Failed Discourse, supra note 80, 
at 791–92.  
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reproduce in some form or another the full list of rights protected 
under the federal version.98 This, of course, has led state courts to 
adopt the tests and doctrines of the Supreme Court as their own.99 
The influence of the gravitational force of federal law on state actors 
is well recognized in the literature, but scholars have paid little at-
tention to this phenomenon in the context of constitutional property. 
II. CONVERGENCE AND (RARE) DIVERGENCE IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROPERTY 
This Part offers empirical evidence regarding whether states ex-
perience a similar gravitational pull—a centripetal force—that lures 
the drafting of state legislation and establishment of state court doc-
trine towards the United States Supreme Court’s takings jurispru-
dence.100 Indeed, the empirical evidence bears out the reality that 
state legislatures have enacted statutes that conform to the Court’s 
doctrine and state courts have applied the Court’s doctrinal tests. 
However, the one major exception to this conformity is the post-
Kelo centrifugal episode that has created today’s rupture between 
continued state convergence in the Court’s regulatory takings vein 
and state divergence in Court’s public use vein.  
A. Convergence in Takings Doctrine 
The federal regulatory takings and public use doctrine have 
greatly influenced state actors. But what is the extent of this con-
formity amongst state courts and their state constitutions?  
1. STATE COURTS AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
Scholars tracking the extent to which states have followed fed-
eral law have said little, if anything, about this relationship as ap-
plied to takings.101 Unlike the constitutional facets of, for example, 
                                                                                                                            
 98  Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 323, 332–33 (2011).  
 99  Id. at 334. 
 100  See also Merrill, supra note 11, at 67 n.24 (discussing survey evidence 
“that most challenges to state condemnations are based on state constitutional pro-
visions rather than on the fourteenth amendment”). 
 101  See Dodson, supra note 1, at 707–29 (examining the state law trend in 
tracking analogous federal laws to decide issues of state law in areas like rules of 
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the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause, the Takings 
Clause “furnishes no comparable constitutional baseline.”102 The 
difference? The Takings Clause “protects primarily against change 
in background state law.”103 Thus, landowners’ protections from 
physical or regulatory takings are determined by background prin-
ciples of state legislation and common law.104 While Supreme Court 
doctrine establishes “a floor below which state courts cannot go to 
protect individual rights,” states have wide latitude to afford greater 
protections under state constitutions.105 Of course, states can provide 
protections above the federal minima where appropriate.  
But more to the point, as a baseline, the federal Takings Clause 
is widely represented within state constitutions.106 An overwhelm-
ing majority of states have a takings clause that parallels the federal 
Constitution’s, although some states offer additional protections by 
adding a “damages” clause.107 Moreover, in the majority of states, 
regulatory takings claims are treated identically under both consti-
tutional texts.108 On the whole, it thus seems that judicial pronounce-
ments from many different states have simply copied the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the Takings Clause.109 For example, the Ar-
izona Constitution provides protection “like” that provided for by 
                                                                                                                            
evidence and employment discrimination). But see Sterk, supra note 21, at 215–
18 (examining how state law provides the starting point of a regulatory Takings 
Clause analysis); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 
117 YALE L.J. 408, 423–24 (2007) (“[T]he Federal Constitution says [property 
rights] cannot be ‘taken’ without just compensation, but they are generally created 
in the first instance by state law.”).  
 102  Sterk, supra note 21, at 206.  
 103  Id. 
 104  Id. 
 105  See State v. Sieyes, 225 P.3d 995, 1003 (Wash. 2010) (en banc). 
 106  JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 1061 n.2 (7th ed. 2010) 
(noting that nearly all state constitutions contain a takings clause worded similarly 
to the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause). 
 107  See Maureen E. Brady, Property’s Ceiling: State Courts and the Expansion 
of Takings Clause Property, 102 VA. L. REV. 1167, 1175 n.19 (2016) (listing state 
constitutions that added expansions to state takings provisions, including damage 
considerations). 
 108  Phillips v. Montgomery County, 442 S.W.3d 233, 240 (Tenn. 2014); see 
infra note 136. 
 109  See Sterk, supra note 21, at 205.  
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the federal provision.110 The Maryland Constitution has the “same 
meaning and effect” as the federal Takings Clause.111 And Ver-
mont’s takings clause demands “virtually the same test.”112 Thus, 
state courts have developed, like other provisions of the Bill of 
Rights, some form of a “takings” jurisprudence.113 To be clear, state 
courts recognizing or identifying substantially similar language be-
tween the state and federal constitutional takings provisions is noth-
ing extraordinary. It seems that the vast majority of state courts are, 
indeed, adopting federal takings jurisprudence.114 While adoption of 
the doctrinal rubric is well-known, the actual application of the doc-
trine at the state level still raises questions. 
As Stewart Sterk notes, state takings regulations are simultane-
ously measured by both federal doctrine and background state 
law.115 That can make for some murky applications of the takings 
doctrine at the state level, and may be the reason why a national 
takings standard is unlikely.116 Because takings doctrine is a muddle 
of confusing tests and complex categorical rules, the manner for 
which state courts follow the Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence 
is curious.117  
The Court’s decision in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council is indica-
tive of the complexity of regulatory takings. There, the Court estab-
lished the longstanding test that a regulation will only be considered 
a “taking” if it denies the landowner of “all economically beneficial 
use” of the property.118 Thus, if the regulation leaves owners with 
                                                                                                                            
 110  Wonders v. Pima County, 89 P.3d 810, 814 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (finding 
Arizona Constitution provided “like” protection to the federal Takings Clause and 
state’s application of Lucas test “consistent” with constitutional requirements). 
 111  Neifert v. Dep’t of the Env’t, 910 A.2d 1100, 1118 n.33 (Md. 2006).  
 112  Ondovchik Family Ltd. P’ship v. Agency of Transp., 996 A.2d 1179, 1184 
(Vt. 2010) (quoting Conway v. Sorrell, 894 F. Supp. 794, 801 n.8 (D. Vt. 1995)). 
 113  See Robert Force, State “Bills of Rights”: A Case of Neglect and the Need 
for a Renaissance, 3 VAL. U. L. REV. 125, 145–42 (1969) (comparing state bills 
of rights provisions to guarantee in the federal Bill of Rights and finding substan-
tial similarities). 
 114  Phillips v. Montgomery County, 442 S.W.3d 233, 244 (Tenn. 2014). 
 115  See Sterk, supra note 21, at 203–26.  
 116  Id. at 226–37. 
 117  Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a 
Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 562–63 (1984).  
 118  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). 
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some viable use of the land, it would likely still be deemed consti-
tutional.119 Another example of the complexity of regulatory takings 
is the Court’s ruling in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., which rejected 
a blend of the due process substantial advances test into the regula-
tory takings analysis.120 This decision, too, has been widely adopted 
by state courts.121 Furthermore, with the Court’s Penn Central test, 
which provides protections where less than all economic benefit is 
lost,122 state courts “almost always defer to the regulatory decisions 
made by government officials, resulting in an almost categorical rule 
that Penn Central-type regulatory actions do not amount to tak-
ings.”123  
State courts seem to employ the federal analytical frameworks 
in examining state constitutional takings claims and rarely offer 
greater protections. In California, for example, one court noted that 
“even if we did intend to interpret the state right more narrowly than 
the federal right,” the federal Takings Clause would still apply to 
protect the property owner.124 In Iowa, courts note that because of 
                                                                                                                            
 119  See Krier & Sterk, supra note 8, at 63.  
 120  544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005). 
 121  See, e.g., Lockaway Storage v. County of Alameda, 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 
623 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013); Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d 
623, 639 (Minn. 2007); Dunes W. Golf Club, LLC v. Town of Mount Pleasant, 
737 S.E.2d 601, 611 (S.C. 2013).  
 122  Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978). 
 123  Krier & Sterk, supra note 8, at 62. Some scholars argue that there tends to 
be little variation and divergence in interpretations of the Supreme Court’s exac-
tion tests described in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 
(1987) and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) by state and lower federal 
courts. See Brett Christopher Gerry, Parity Revisited: An Empirical Comparison 
of State and Lower Federal Court Interpretations of Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 233, 259–69 (1999) (discussing Tak-
ings Clause cases). Other studies found that state courts cite Nollan and Dolan 
relatively frequently (two-thirds of the time) and state courts appear “to be aware 
of [the Nollan and Dolan] mandates.” Krier & Sterk, supra note 8, at 68. But, 
another empirical study has found that “few state court decisions even mentioned 
[Nollan and Dolan] in reaching decisions subject to them.” Id. at 68 n.129; see 
also Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Non-Impact of the United States Supreme Court 
Regulatory Takings Cases on the State Courts: Does the Supreme Court Really 
Matter?, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 523, 537–56 (1995) (analyzing state court de-
cisions interpreting the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings cases). 
 124  Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 941 P.2d 851, 860 (Cal. 1997). 
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the similarities of the two provisions, “we consider federal cases in-
terpreting the federal provision persuasive in our interpretation of 
the state provision.”125 Maryland courts follow suit, noting that the 
Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence is “practically [a] direct au-
thorit[y]” for analyzing takings challenges in both state and federal 
claims.126 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court expressly de-
clined to adopt more expansive protections beyond the federal base-
line.127 Minnesota has usually followed the standards set forth in 
Penn Central as the “best analytic framework” to evaluate regula-
tory takings under the state constitution.128 In Maine, the Supreme 
Judicial Court has preferred to analyze state and federal takings 
claims together.129 Arizona, for example, tends to equate its state 
takings clause with the federal.130 Some, like California, are reluc-
tant, even though they could, to depart from the federal doctrinal 
script.131 Others are more general in their approach to comparing 
both documents.132 
                                                                                                                            
 125  Kingsway Cathedral v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 711 N.W.2d 6, 9 (Iowa 
2006).  
 126  Neifert v. Dep’t of the Env’t, 910 A.2d 1100, 1118 n.33 (Md. 2006) (quot-
ing Green Party v. Bd. of Electors, 832 A.2d 214, 237 (Md. 2003)). 
 127  Blair v. Dep’t of Conservation & Recreation, 932 N.E.2d 267, 274 (Mass. 
2010).  
 128  Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d 623, 633 (Minn. 
2007).  
 129  See, e.g., MC Assocs. v. Town of Cape Elizabeth, 773 A.2d 439, 443 (Me. 
2001).  
 130  See Mutschler v. City of Phoenix, 129 P.3d 71, 72 n.1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) 
(noting that the Arizona takings clause “provides that ‘[n]o private property shall 
be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation having 
first been made’” and that “[f]or purposes of this case, the analysis of appellants’ 
Takings Clause claim is the same under both the Federal and Arizona Constitu-
tions” (alteration in original) (quoting ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 17)); Wonders v. 
Pima County, 89 P.3d 810, 814–16 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (finding Arizona con-
stitution provided “like” protection to the federal Takings Clause and state’s ap-
plication of Lucas test “consistent” with constitutional requirements). 
 131  Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 941 P.2d 851, 860 (Cal. 1997) 
(stating that “[e]ven if we did intend to interpret the state right more narrowly than 
the federal right, the federal Constitution would nevertheless apply here to pro-
tect” the plaintiff landowner). 
 132  Leone v. County of Maui, 284 P.3d 956, 962–63 (Haw. Ct. App. 2012) 
(reviewing inverse condemnation claim under Hawaii and federal Takings 
Clause); Boise Tower Assocs., LLC v. Hogland, 215 P.3d 494, 503 (Idaho 2009) 
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Some states, like Iowa, are explicit in the level of protections 
afforded under the state and federal clauses, often times finding the 
state does not go further.133 Some prefer to rely upon both federal 
                                                                                                                            
(evaluating state takings claim exclusively under federal takings doctrine); N. Ill. 
Home Builder Ass’n v. County of Du Page, 649 N.E.2d 384, 388 (Ill. 1995) (ex-
amining plaintiffs’ takings claim under both the state and federal takings clauses); 
Kan. One-Call Sys., Inc. v. State, 274 P.3d 625, 638 (Kan. 2012) (relying on Su-
preme Court distinction of two types of regulations that are considered per se tak-
ings); Baston v. Cty. of Kenton ex rel. Kenton Cty. Airport Bd., 319 S.W.3d 401, 
406 (Ky. 2010) (explaining that both the Kentucky Constitution and the U.S. Con-
stitution require just compensation for a taking); Annison v. Hoover, 517 So. 2d 
420, 423 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (assessing a takings claim under both the Louisiana 
Constitution and U.S. Constitution); Neifert v. Dep’t of the Env’t, 910 A.2d 1100, 
1118 n.33 (Md. 2006) (stating that the Supreme Court takings cases are “practi-
cally direct authorities” for the federal and Maryland takings clauses, and that the 
takings clauses of the federal and Maryland Constitutions “have the same mean-
ing and effect” (internal citations omitted)); Tolksdorf v. Griffith, 626 N.W.2d 
163, 165 (Mich. 2001) (stating that “[t]he Taking Clause of the state constitution 
is substantially similar to that of the federal constitution”); Adams Outdoor Ad-
vert. v. City of East Lansing, 614 N.W.2d 634, 638 (Mich. 2000) (drawing on 
Supreme Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence and similarities between fed-
eral and state takings clause); K & K Constr., Inc. v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 575 
N.W.2d 531, 534–35 (Mich. 1998); Kafka v. Mont. Dep’t of Fish, Wildlife & 
Parks, 201 P.3d 8, 18 (Mont. 2008); Scofield v. State Dep’t of Nat. Res., 753 
N.W.2d 345, 358–59 (Neb. 2008); MC Assocs., 773 A.2d at 443 (preferring to 
analyze state and federal takings claims together); Seawall Assocs. v. City of New 
York, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1062–70 (N.Y. 1989) (finding local regulations effect 
takings under New York and federal constitutions); Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. 
of Wash. v. State, 13 P.3d 183, 187–88 (Wash. 2000) (noting that under existing 
Washington and federal law, a police power measure can violate the state and 
federal constitutions and thus be subject to a categorical “facial” taking chal-
lenge). 
 133  Harms v. City of Sibley, 702 N.W.2d 91, 97 (Iowa 2005) (noting that 
“[b]ecause the Harms have not asserted and ‘we have not found a basis to distin-
guish the protection afforded by the Iowa Constitution from those afforded by the 
Federal Constitution under the facts of this case, our [takings] analysis applies 
equally to both the state and federal grounds’” (quoting State v. Carter, 696 
N.W.2d 31, 37 (Iowa 2005))); Blair v. Dep’t of Conservation & Recreation, 932 
N.E.2d 267, 274 (Mass. 2010) (declining to adopt more expansive protections be-
yond what the federal takings clause affords and instead following its “long-stand-
ing precedent” to interpret state Takings Clause to provide property owners the 
same protections as under federal law); McCarran Int’l Airport v. Sisolak, 137 
P.3d 1110, 1121 (Nev. 2006) (following federal takings precedent, but arguing 
that state takings clause has expansive protections); Mansoldo v. State, 898 A.2d 
1018, 1023–24 (N.J. 2006) (stating that “protection from governmental takings 
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and state clauses to make a determination, but rarely go beyond the 
federal even if the state clause provides such flexibility.134 Others 
will explicitly follow the Lucas, Palazzolo,135 and Penn Central 
tests without much explanation for why.136 Even in the exactions 
                                                                                                                            
under the New Jersey Constitution is coextensive with protection under the Fed-
eral Constitution”); Moongate Water Co. v. City of Las Cruces, 302 P.3d 405, 410 
(N.M. 2013) (explaining that in evaluating takings claims under the New Mexico 
Constitution, the court turns to both the federal and state takings cases for guid-
ance, since the state takings clause provides “similar” protection to the federal). 
 134  Animas Valley Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 38 P.3d 59, 
63–65 (Colo. 2001) (relying on both Colorado and federal case law for guidance, 
and concluding that by “[r]eading [Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 
(2001),] together with the Court’s prior precedent, it is apparent that the level of 
interference must be very high,” drawing its conclusions from several Supreme 
Court sources); A. Gallo & Co. v. Comm’r of Envtl. Prot., 73 A.3d 693, 701 
(Conn. 2013) (assessing both the federal and state constitutions’ Takings 
Clauses); Wild Rice River Estates, Inc. v. City of Fargo, 705 N.W.2d 850, 856 
(N.D. 2005) (noting that state supreme court “looked to both state and federal 
precedents in construing takings claims under the state constitution,” but that the 
state takings clause is “broader in some respects” than the federal Takings 
Clause); Ondovchik Family Ltd. P’ship v. Agency of Transp., 996 A.2d 1179, 
1184 (Vt. 2010) (determining that since the Federal and Vermont Constitutions 
“use virtually the same test for takings review,” the “analysis and result in this 
case are the same” under both provisions (quoting Conway v. Sorrell, 894 F. Supp. 
794, 801 n.8 (D. Vt. 1995))). 
 135  See infra notes 297–98 and accompanying text for more information on 
Palazzolo. 
 136  Forest Glade Mgmt., L.L.C. v. City of Hot Springs, No. CA 08-200, 2008 
WL 4876230, at *2–3 (Ark. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2008) (following the reasoning of 
Lucas to adjudicate a takings claim); Salem Church (Del.) Assocs. v. New Castle 
County, No. 20305-NC, 2006 WL 4782453, at *16 (Del. Ch. Oct. 6, 2006) (rely-
ing on and applying Penn Central test in evaluating state takings claim); Embassy 
Real Estate Holdings, L.L.C. v. D.C. Mayor’s Agent for Historic Pres., 944 A.2d 
1036, 1052–55 (D.C. 2008) (applying Penn Central test to state takings claim); 
Greater Atlanta Homebuilders Ass’n v. DeKalb County, 588 S.E.2d 694, 697–98 
(Ga. 2003) (dismissing appellants’ takings claim on grounds that Penn Central 
test was not satisfied); Pub. Access Shoreline Haw. v. Haw. Cty. Planning 
Comm’n, 903 P.2d 1246, 1272–73 (Haw. 1995) (analyzing and deciding takings 
claim under Lucas test); Frick v. City of Salina, 235 P.3d 1211, 1223 (Kan. 2010) 
(noting that “to determine whether the moratorium imposed in this case was a 
taking, we must apply the Penn Central standards”); DeCook v. Rochester Int’l 
Airport Joint Zoning Bd., 796 N.W.2d 299, 305 (Minn. 2011) (noting that the 
court has “often applied Penn Central to decide a regulatory takings case under 
the Minnesota Constitution”); Wensmann Realty, 734 N.W.2d at 631–33 (noting 
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context, some state courts have also resorted to the federal baseline 
and “appeared to be aware of” the Court’s exactions mandates.137 
                                                                                                                            
that the court had “relied on cases interpreting” the federal Takings Clause in in-
terpreting the Minnesota Takings Clause, and agreeing that “the standards set 
forth in Penn Central provide the best analytic framework to determine whether 
the city’s actions resulted in a regulatory taking under the Minnesota Constitu-
tion”); Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 799 A.2d 751, 762 (Pa. 
2002) (applying Supreme Court’s Palazzolo reasoning to takings claim, stating 
“[a] similar result should follow in this case”); Bd. of Supervisors v. Greengael, 
L.L.C., 626 S.E.2d 357, 369 (Va. 2006) (evaluating state takings claims under 
Supreme Court’s Penn Central loss of less than all economic value test); McFillan 
v. Berkeley Cty. Planning Comm’n, 438 S.E.2d 801, 809 (W. Va. 1993) (analyz-
ing takings claim under state and federal takings clause applying Lucas test); R.W. 
Docks & Slips v. State, 628 N.W. 2d 781, 786 (Wis. 2001) (noting that Wisconsin 
courts follow and apply a version of the Lucas test); Eberle v. Dane Cty. Bd. of 
Adjustment, 595 N.W.2d 730, 737 (Wis. 1999) (noting that Wisconsin applies the 
same regulatory takings rules as the federal courts, such as the Lucas test, which 
state that regulations that deny a landowner of all or substantially all of the land’s 
practical use constitute a taking); Cheyenne Airport Bd. v. Rogers, 707 P.2d 717, 
728–32 (Wyo. 1985). 
 137  Krier & Sterk, supra note 8, at 68; see Clay Cty. ex rel. Cty. Comm’n v. 
Harley & Susie Bogue, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 102, 107 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (consid-
ering the same factors as the Supreme Court in evaluating a takings claim under 
the Missouri Takings Clause and adopting the Supreme Court’s Nollan test). 
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Some courts will peer into the plain text of both documents to deter-
mine differences.138 South Carolina once revised its position on tak-
ings by conforming to the Supreme Court reasoning.139 Few have 
expressly elected the state approach over the federal approach.140 
Other state courts acknowledge that the legislature may confer 
greater protections than those offered by takings clauses, but rarely 
have those courts extended further protections.141 And, of course, 
state supreme courts are choosing to follow, rather than lead, based 
on the precedent set by lower state appellate courts which also slav-
ishly follow the Supreme Court’s doctrine.142  
                                                                                                                            
 138  State v. Kimco of Evansville, Inc., 902 N.E.2d 206, 210 (Ind. 2009) (noting 
that “the state and federal takings clauses are textually indistinguishable and are 
to be analyzed identically”); Kingsway Cathedral v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 711 
N.W.2d 6, 9 (Iowa 2006) (stating that “[b]ecause of [the state and federal] simi-
larity regarding takings, we consider federal cases interpreting the federal provi-
sion persuasive in our interpretation of the state provision”); Walters v. City of 
Greenville, 751 So. 2d 1206, 1210 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that “Mississippi 
case law gives no distinct definition of a ‘taking’ of property; therefore, we turn 
to federal case law which has given such definition”); Hallco Tex., Inc. v. McMul-
len County, 221 S.W.3d 50, 56 (Tex. 2006) (explaining that “[a]lthough our tak-
ings provision is worded differently than the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution, we have described it as ‘comparable’ and 
the parties here agree that it is appropriate to look to federal cases for guidance”); 
Sheffield Dev. Co. v. City of Glenn Heights, 140 S.W.3d 660, 669 (Tex. 2004) 
(analyzing takings claim by applying Texas Takings Clause to “federal jurispru-
dence for guidance,” even though “it could be argued that the differences in the 
wording of the two provisions are significant”). 
 139  Byrd v. City of Hartsville, 620 S.E.2d 76, 79 n.6 (S.C. 2005) (revising state 
takings doctrine to conform and comply with Supreme Court reasoning and noting 
that “[t]akings analysis under South Carolina law is the same as the analysis under 
federal law” (citing Westside Quik Shop v. Stewart, 534 S.E.2d 270, 275 (S.C. 
2000))). 
 140  State ex rel. R.T.G., Inc. v. State, 780 N.E.2d 998, 1008 (Ohio 2002) (de-
clining to invoke Lucas’ dicta on how to define the relevant parcel for the takings 
analysis, instead “determining the relevant parcel in a takings analysis pursuant 
to the Takings Clause of the Ohio Constitution”). 
 141  See Kimco, 902 N.E.2d at 212 (“Constitutional doctrine is not the end of 
the matter. Legislatures may confer greater rights to compensation for government 
action than those afforded by the constitutional takings clauses.”).  
 142  Wonders v. Pima County, 89 P.3d 810, 814 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (finding 
Arizona’s constitution provided “like” protection to the federal Takings Clause 
and the state’s application of the Lucas test “consistent” with constitutional re-
quirements); Forest Glade Mgmt., L.L.C. v. City of Hot Springs, No. CA 08-200, 
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In short, not only do state supreme courts mimic federal regula-
tory takings doctrine, they usually decline to apply the doctrine in a 
way that would offer more protections for landowners and rarely go 
beyond or modify the Supreme Court’s doctrinal baseline.143 Indeed, 
the narrative in constitutional property seems to fit the gravitational 
narrative in other areas of constitutional law that are subject to a 
constitutional bottom.144 However, there are a few examples of di-
vergence, and we should be cautious not to claim wholesale con-
formity across the board.145 
                                                                                                                            
2008 WL 4876230, at *2–3 (Ark. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2008) (following the reason-
ing of Lucas to adjudicate a takings claim); Salem Church (Del.) Assocs. v. New 
Castle County, No. 20305-NC, 2006 WL 4782453, at *16 (Del. Ch. Oct. 6, 2006) 
(relying on and applying Penn Central test in evaluating state takings claim); Wal-
ters, 751 So. 2d at 1210 (stating that “Mississippi case law gives no distinct defi-
nition of a ‘taking’ of property; therefore, we turn to federal case law which has 
given such definition”); Annison v. Hoover, 517 So. 2d 420, 423 (La. Ct. App. 
1987) (assessing a takings claim under both the Louisiana Constitution and U.S. 
Constitution); See Mutschler v. City of Phoenix, 129 P.3d 71, 72 n.1 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2006) (noting that the Arizona takings clause “provides that ‘[n]o private 
property shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compen-
sation having first been made’” and that “[f]or purposes of this case, the analysis 
of appellants’ Takings Clause claim is the same under both the Federal and Ari-
zona Constitutions” (alteration in original) (quoting ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 17)); 
see also Twain Harte Assocs. v. County of Tuolumne, 265 Cal. Rptr. 737, 749 
(1990); G & A Land, LLC v. City of Brighton, 233 P.3d 701, 706 (Colo. App. 
2010); Clay County, 988 S.W.2d at 107; Beroth Oil Co. v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 
725 S.E.2d 651, 661 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012).  
 143  See infra Section III.A. The recent decision by the Tennessee Supreme 
Court in Phillips v. Montgomery County, discussed at length in Section III.A, 
seems to suggest, from the vantage point of a state supreme court, that sister state 
courts have been pulled by the gravitational force of the federal regulatory takings 
analytical framework, but also notes the few exceptions where states provided 
greater protections or developed their own tests. 442 S.W. 3d 233, 240 n.10 (Tenn. 
2014). 
 144  However, some state courts have said otherwise, noting that “there is no 
reason why [the state constitution] cannot be interpreted to provide fewer protec-
tions than the Federal Constitution,” even though “[o]f course, . . . [where] the 
Federal Constitution is more expansive, it must override contrary state law.” 
Sanders v. State, 585 A.2d 117, 146 n.25 (Del. 1990); see Davis v. Brown, 851 
N.E.2d 1198, 1204 (Ill. 2006) (applying general principles of whether regulation 
“goes too far” under Supreme Court’s Penn Central test). 
 145  R & Y, Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 34 P.3d 289, 293 n.11 (Alaska 
2001) (stating that “[t]he inclusion of the term ‘damage’ affords the property 
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owner broader protection than that conferred by the Fifth Amendment to the Fed-
eral Constitution” (quoting Ehrlander v. State Dep’t of Transp. & Pub. Facilities, 
797 P.2d 629, 633 (Alaska 1990))); San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of 
San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 100–02 (Cal. 2002); Herzberg v. County of Plumas, 
34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 595 (Cal Ct. App. 2005) (“The California Constitution also 
requires just compensation when private property is ‘damaged for public use.’ ‘By 
virtue of including “damage[]” to property as well as its “tak[ing],” the California 
clause “protects a somewhat broader range of property values” than does the cor-
responding federal provision.’ Apart from that difference, however, the California 
Supreme Court has construed the state clause congruently with the federal clause” 
(alterations in original) (citations omitted)); DeCook v. Rochester Int’l Airport 
Joint Zoning Bd., 796 N.W.2d 299, 305–06 (Minn. 2011) (holding that an airport 
zoning ordinance which diminished the value of nearby property located in a run-
way safety zone by as much as six percent (6%) was a compensable regulatory 
taking under the Minnesota Constitution, which requires compensation where pri-
vate property is “taken, destroyed or damaged for public use” because the regula-
tion benefited a specific governmental purpose and caused the owners to suffer a 
“substantial and measurable decline” in the market value of their property; while 
Minnesota courts had previously followed the Supreme Court’s Penn Central de-
cision, which interpreted the less broadly-phrased federal takings clause, the court 
noted that Penn Central was “not the only test” and declined to apply it where a 
regulatory action would be considered a taking under the Minnesota takings 
clause because of damage to property value caused by a regulation); Interstate 
Cos. v. City of Bloomington, 790 N.W.2d 409, 413–14 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) 
(explaining that the Minnesota state constitution provides more protection be-
cause it requires compensation when property is “damaged” or “destroyed,” as 
well as “taken,” and thus “where land use regulations, such as the airport zoning 
ordinance here, are designed to benefit a specific public or governmental enter-
prise, there must be compensation to landowners whose property has suffered a 
substantial and measurable decline in market value as a result of the regulations” 
(quoting McShane v. City of Faribault, 292 N.W.2d 253, 258–59 (Minn. 1980)); 
Wild Rice River Estates, Inc. v. City of Fargo, 705 N.W.2d 850, 856 (N.D. 2005) 
(explaining that “[under North Dakota Constitution article I, section 16], ‘[p]ri-
vate property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compen-
sation.’ This Court has said our state constitutional provision is broader in some 
respects than its federal counterpart because the state provision ‘was intended to 
secure to owners, not only the possession of property, but also those rights which 
render possession valuable’” (alteration in original) (quoting Grand Forks-Traill 
Water Users, Inc. v. Hjelle, 413 N.W.2d 344, 346 (N.D. 1987))); Estate & Heirs 
of Sanchez v. County of Bernalillo, 902 P.2d 550, 553 (N.M. 1995) (noting that 
New Mexico, unlike the United States, requires compensation when property is 
damaged, but not taken, but in order to require compensation, the damage must 
affect some property right that is not generally shared or enjoyed by the public); 
Krier v. Dell Rapids Township, 709 N.W.2d 841, 846 (S.D. 2006) (“Article VI, 
section 13 of our Constitution differs from the Fifth Amendment of the Federal 
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A few state courts have taken steps to interpret their takings 
clauses to offer greater protection to property owners in regulatory 
takings challenges than would be required by the federal takings 
doctrine.146 A handful of states have developed their own takings 
tests that offer stronger protections, or declined the Court’s doctrine 
altogether.147 For example, the Washington Supreme Court has 
stated that its state constitution has a history of extending greater 
protections from governmental interference with private property; it 
declined to follow the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings doctrine, 
instead choosing to follow a state-formulated regulatory takings 
test.148 The Nevada Supreme Court has suggested that its takings 
clause “contemplates expansive property rights” beyond the federal 
Takings Clause, and that a regulatory takings analysis under the 
                                                                                                                            
Constitution in two key respects. First . . . we impose ‘public use’ requirements 
that are more strict than the federal baseline. Second, our Constitution requires 
that the government compensate a property owner not only when a taking has 
occurred, but also when private property has been ‘damaged.’ The Federal Con-
stitution does not contain a ‘damage’ clause.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 146  See, e.g., R & Y, Inc., 34 P.3d at 293 (acknowledging that the Alaska Con-
stitution provides property owners broader protection than the United States Con-
stitution); Avenal v. State, 886 So. 2d 1085, 1104 (La. 2004) (noting that the Lou-
isiana Constitution requires compensation for property “damaged” as well as 
“taken”); Gilich v. Miss. State Highway Comm’n, 574 So. 2d 8, 11–12 (Miss. 
1990) (holding that the Mississippi Constitution provides broader protection than 
the United States Constitution for property “taken or damaged” (emphasis omit-
ted)); Krier, 709 N.W.2d at 846 (recognizing that the South Dakota Constitution 
imposes stricter requirements than the United States Constitution, such as com-
pensation when property is “taken” or “damaged”).  
 147  See, e.g., Town of Gurley v. M & N Materials, Inc., 143 So. 3d 1, 12, 49–
50 (Ala. 2012) (declining to recognize regulatory takings under the state constitu-
tion and rejecting federal precedents); Coast Range Conifers, LLC v. State ex rel. 
State Bd. of Forestry, 117 P.3d 990, 996 (Or. 2005) (en banc) (noting that a regu-
latory taking occurs under the Oregon Constitution only when there is no econom-
ically viable use of the property); Utah Dep’t of Transp. v. Admiral Beverage 
Corp., 275 P.3d 208, 215 (Utah 2011) (explaining that Utah’s just compensation 
clause is triggered when there is “any substantial interference with private prop-
erty which destroys or materially lessens its value, or by which the owner’s right 
to its use and enjoyment is in any substantial degree abridged or destroyed” (quot-
ing Stockdale v. Rio Grande W. Ry. Co., 77 P. 849, 852 (Utah 1904))); Manufac-
tured Hous. Cmtys. of Wash. v. State, 13 P.3d 183, 187–88 (Wash. 2000); 
Guimont v. Clarke, 854 P.2d 1, 5–11 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (developing a series 
of tests to determine if a compensable taking has occurred, drawing upon both 
state and federal precedents).  
 148  Manufactured Hous. Cmtys., 13 P.3d at 189, 196–97.  
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state constitution, unlike federal doctrine, occurs when the state fails 
to “follow . . . procedures” under state law and “appropriates or per-
manently invades private property.”149 North Dakota has found that 
the state takings provision is broader “in some respects” than the 
federal provision “because the state provision ‘was intended to se-
cure to owners, not only the possession of property, but also those 
rights which render possession valuable.’”150 Most extreme is the 
Alabama Supreme Court, which has declined to recognize regula-
tory takings under state constitutional law and rejects federal prece-
dents.151 There, the Alabama Supreme Court looked to the plain lan-
guage of the Alabama constitution’s takings clause, finding that the 
clause “does not make compensable regulatory ‘takings’” and that 
the language of the federal and state clauses were not similar enough 
to give rise to a regulatory takings claim under state constitutional 
law.152 And what about state actors’ approaches to the federal public 
use doctrine? It is mostly the same—mimicry. 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Berman spurred the broader, 
modern-day takings conception.153 Justice Douglas stated that 
“[s]ubject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature 
has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh 
conclusive.”154 The Court held that takings for the underlying pur-
pose of clearing slums and blighted neighborhoods was a valid pub-
lic use under the Takings Clause.155 Berman not only opened the 
                                                                                                                            
 149  McCarran Int’l Airport v. Sisolak, 137 P.3d 1110, 1127 (Nev. 2006). A 
persuasive dissent begs to differ based on records of the drafters of the constitu-
tion. Id. at 1131 n.8 (Becker, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).  
 150  Wild Rice, 705 N.W.2d at 856 (noting, however, that “our cases on inverse 
condemnation under the state constitution bear some similarities to the federal 
analysis.”). 
 151  Town of Gurley, 143 So. 3d at 12, 49–50 (declining to recognize regulatory 
takings under the state constitution and rejecting federal precedents) 
 152 Id. at 13. 
 153  Romeo v. Cranston Redevelopment Agency, 254 A.2d 426, 432 (R.I. 1969) 
(“Perhaps the single greatest contribution to the expanded view of a public use 
came in 1954 with the holding of the United States Supreme Court in the case of 
[Berman].”). 
 154  Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). 
 155  Id. at 35–36. In Berman, the Court was faced with a redevelopment project 
that sought to ameliorate a blighted area in Washington D.C. Id. at 28. The hous-
ing was decrepit and uninhabitable. Id. Thus, the City condemned the land and 
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door for urban renewal projects to flourish, but also introduced eco-
nomic development as a tempting justification for eminent do-
main.156 Decades later, the Supreme Court stuck closely, once again, 
to its broad conception of eminent domain in Midkiff, ruling that a 
Hawaii statute that allowed fee title to be taken from landlords and 
transferred to tenants in an effort to reduce the concentration of land 
ownership was a valid public use.157 The majority of state courts 
seem to have gravitated to the Court’s broader conception of “public 
use.”158 Even though the Berman decision implied federal takings, 
the ruling has had a formidable influence over state courts.159 Many 
scholars have argued that as a result of Berman, both state and fed-
eral courts have given legislatures and administrative agencies far 
too much discretion in eminent domain determinations justified only 
by the Supreme Court saying so.160 Indeed, following Berman 
                                                                                                                            
transferred title to private entities for the public purpose of redevelopment, which 
also included construction of low-cost housing. Id. at 28–32. In upholding this 
purpose, the Court was unpersuaded that nonblighted property within a blighted 
neighborhood meant that the creation of a better balanced and more attractive 
community was not a justifiable public use to exercise condemnation. Id. at 35. 
 156  See, e.g., People ex rel. City of Urbana v. Paley, 368 N.E.2d 915, 921 (Ill. 
1977); Green v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 131 N.W.2d 5, 17 (Iowa 1964); Common 
Cause v. State, 455 A.2d 1, 25 (Me. 1983); City of Pipestone v. Madsen, 178 
N.W.2d 594, 600–01, 604 (Minn. 1970); Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 467 
S.E.2d 615, 627 (N.C. 1996). 
 157  Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 233–34, 245 (1984).  
 158  See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUC-
TURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 47–48 (1998); HOWARD GILLMAN, 
THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE 
POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 228 n.104 (1993); Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public 
Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 9 (2003). Pritchett notes that state courts were ambiva-
lent about the broad conception of public use through many nineteenth century 
eminent domain battles leading up to the Berman ruling. Id. While the Supreme 
Court’s early acceptance of economic development as a justifiable public use 
blossomed, many state courts continued to apply a narrow and limited version of 
the doctrine. Id. at 13. It is also worth noting that in 1923, the Supreme Court 
exercised a limited role in reviewing public use cases and that state determinations 
regarding public use would be viewed with “great respect” by the Court. Id. at 12 
(discussing Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 705–06 (1923)). 
 159  See Laura Mansnerus, Note, Public Use, Private Use, and Judicial Review 
in Eminent Domain, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 409, 426 (1983). 
 160  Pritchett, supra note 158, at 4–5 (citing Stephen J. Jones, Trumping Emi-
nent Domain Law: An Argument for Strict Scrutiny Analysis Under the Public 
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thirty-four state supreme courts adopted the Court’s broad interpre-
tation of public use and applied such a rubric to condemnation chal-
lenges.161 
The Court’s ruling is buttressed by the fact that state constitu-
tions have copied the federal takings clause, which has led to wide-
spread application of the broader conception of public use by state 
courts in state eminent domain challenges.162 As Wendell Pritchett 
notes, in the nineteenth century, state courts struggled to follow both 
the broad and narrow conceptions of public use, particularly as their 
applications by the Supreme Court were occasionally incon-
sistent.163 While some surveys suggest that most state challenges to 
eminent domain by private property owners are based on state con-
stitutional provisions,164 this finding does not answer whether state 
courts invariably looked (and still look) to the federal provision for 
guidance. Neither does it answer to what extent the Court’s public 
use doctrine is applied to resolve a case. Some commentators have 
noted that state courts were slower than federal courts to conform to 
the Supreme Court’s broad, deferential public use doctrine.165 
Thomas Merrill notes that the delay may have been due to separation 
of power principles that were weaker at the state level than the fed-
eral level, “because interest groups may exert greater control over 
state governments.”166 Nonetheless, it seems that a majority of state 
                                                                                                                            
Use Requirement of the Fifth Amendment, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 285, 289–90 
(2000); Donald J. Kochan, “Public Use” and the Independent Judiciary: Con-
demnation in an Interest-Group Perspective, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 49, 60–61 
(1998); Joseph J. Lazzarotti, Public Use or Public Abuse, 68 UMKC L. REV. 49 
(1999); Errol E. Meidinger, The “Public Uses” of Eminent Domain: History and 
Policy, 11 ENVTL. L. 1, 18 (1980)).  
 161  INST. FOR JUST., FIVE YEARS AFTER KELO: THE SWEEPING BACKLASH 
AGAINST ONE OF THE SUPREME COURT’S MOST-DESPISED DECISIONS (2010), 
https://ij.org/wo-content/uploads/2015/08/kelo5year_ann-white_paper.pdf;  
Wesley W. Horton & Brendon P. Levesque, Kelo is Not Dred Scott, 48 CONN. L. 
REV. 1405, 1420 (2016). 
 162  Merrill, supra note 11, at 67 n.24. North Carolina is an exception. Id. 
 163  Pritchett, supra note 158, at 9.  
 164  Merrill, supra note 11, at 67 n.24. 
 165  Id. at 68–69 n.30. 
 166  Id.  
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actors responded to Berman by following the federal public use doc-
trine, and did so for decades.167 Indeed, “nearly all courts have set-
tled on a broader understanding that requires only that the taking 
                                                                                                                            
 167  City of Birmingham v. Tutwiler Drug Co., 475 So. 2d 458, 468 (Ala. 1985) 
(citing Berman to explain that “[t]he role of the judiciary in determining whether 
the legislature is exercising its power for a public purpose is an extremely narrow 
one,” and that “[c]ourts should not determine whether a particular urban renewal 
or redevelopment project is desirable”); City of Phoenix v. Superior Court, 671 
P.2d 387, 393–94 (Ariz. 1983) (relying on Berman to determine that “the function 
of the judiciary in determining whether an area is a slum or blighted area is to 
review the findings of the governing body, rather than to make an original deter-
mination”); Arvada Urban Renewal Auth. v. Columbine Prof’l Plaza Ass’n, 85 
P.3d 1066, 1073 (Colo. 2004) (en banc) (explaining that the Court’s precedent 
adopted the Berman analysis before and that the “requirement ensures that con-
demnation actions undertaken pursuant to an urban renewal project do not run 
afoul of the constitutional requirement that private property be taken only for a 
public use”); Rabinoff v. Dist. Court, 360 P.2d 114, 119–20 (Colo. 1961) (en 
banc) (noting that, in light of Berman, “[a]lthough the constitutional restriction [at 
issue] is different, the reasoning of the Supreme Court is persuasive in that it em-
phasizes that the ultimate private ownership aspect does not render the scheme 
invalid”); Boise Redevelopment Agency v. Yick Kong Corp., 499 P.2d 575, 579 
(Idaho 1972) (noting that Berman’s interpretation of public use “has been the 
nearly universal consensus of the courts”); Hous. & Redevelopment Auth. of St. 
Paul v. Coleman’s Serv., Inc., 160 N.W.2d 266, 270 (Minn. 1968) (noting that 
following Berman, the court has in the past “pointed out that Federal and state 
statutes relating to housing, redevelopment, and urban renewal projects are con-
stitutional in that the acquisition and clearing of blighted areas serve a public pur-
pose”); Mayor of Vicksburg v. Thomas, 645 So. 2d 940, 942–43 (Miss. 1994) 
(relying on Berman as baseline public use analysis); Paulk v. Hous. Auth. of Tu-
pelo, 195 So. 2d 488, 490–92 (Miss. 1967) (holding, in reliance on Berman, that 
it was constitutional for the municipal housing authority to condemn an owner’s 
land that was located within the slum area marked for condemnation to make way 
for urban renewal); City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Pap-
pas, 76 P.3d 1, 14 (Nev. 2003) (following Berman); Urban Renewal Agency of 
Reno v. Iacometti, 379 P.2d 466, 469 (Nev. 1963) (relying on Berman to explain 
that property may be taken for redevelopment); Wilson v. City of Long Branch, 
142 A.2d 837, 842–43 (N.J. 1958) (noting that, based on Berman, urban redevel-
opment and economic development are “intimately related to the public health, 
welfare, and safety and so are consonant with both Federal and State Constitu-
tions”); Isaacs v. Oklahoma City, 437 P.2d 229, 234 (Okla. 1966) (explaining that 
the Court has upheld the constitutionality of urban renewal laws that allowed post-
condemnation use of the property by private interests); Romeo v. Cranston Rede-
velopment Agency, 254 A.2d 426, 432 (R.I. 1969) (explaining that “[p]erhaps the 
single greatest contribution” to the public use doctrine is Berman); Davis v. City 
of Lubbock, 326 S.W.2d 699, 703 (Tex. 1959) (explaining that, in light of Ber-
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yield some public benefit or advantage.”168 This conception drives 
much of the deference state courts give to state actors, such as state 
administrative agencies, exercising eminent domain.169 Between 
1954 and 1986, a majority of state and federal appellate court deci-
sions held that a government taking by eminent domain was for a 
public use, analytically following the Court’s jurisprudence.170 This 
is unsurprising given the broad deference granted to the Court’s pub-
lic use doctrine. Many states have declined to expand takings pro-
tections beyond the Supreme Court’s minima and generally have 
been amenable to the broad deference handed down in Berman and 
Midkiff.171  
                                                                                                                            
man, “[t]he question of ‘public use,’ as far as the due process of the federal con-
stitution is concerned, has been settled”); Miller v. City of Tacoma, 378 P.2d 464, 
471 (Wash. 1963) (citing Berman to explain that “any question of public use or 
due process under the federal constitution, with regard to [urban renewal] legisla-
tion, is settled”); Charleston Urban Renewal Auth. v. Courtland Co., 509 S.E.2d 
569, 573 (W. Va. 1998) (relying upon the Supreme Court’s Berman decision as 
“instructive” on questions related to condemnations for urban redevelopment and 
blight removal).  
 168  DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 196 (2002). 
However, as Ilya Somin notes, “these postmortems for the narrow view turned out 
to be premature” as several state supreme courts still held a narrow conception of 
public use despite the Berman decision. ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: KELO 
V. CITY OF NEW LONDON AND THE LIMITS OF EMINENT DOMAIN 60 (2015). 
 169  See Jones, supra note 160, at 294. The Supreme Court’s narrower concep-
tion, which gave courts de novo review over questions of the public use of eminent 
domain, continued as late at the 1930s. See Paul W. Tschetter, Note, Kelo v. New 
London: A Divided Court Affirms the Rational Basis Standard of Review in Eval-
uating Local Determinations of ‘Public Use,’ 51 S.D. L. REV. 193, 220–21 (2006). 
 170  See Merrill, supra note 11, at 96. Decisions upholding takings as satisfying 
a public use did decrease slightly when narrowed to only state court decisions. Id. 
(noting that “[l]ooking at the state appellate decisions alone, we find that 16.2%, 
roughly one in six, held that a proposed taking did not serve a public use”). 
 171  See, e.g., Wright v. City of Palmer, 468 P.2d 326, 330–31 (Alaska 1970); 
People ex rel. City of Urbana v. Paley, 368 N.E.2d 915, 921 (Ill. 1977); Green v. 
City of Mt. Pleasant, 131 N.W.2d 5, 17 (Iowa 1964); Common Cause v. State, 
455 A.2d 1, 25–26 (Me. 1983); City of Frostburg v. Jenkins, 136 A.2d 852, 855-
56 (Md. 1957); City of Pipestone v. Madsen, 178 N.W.2d 594, 600–01 (Minn. 
1970); Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 467 S.E.2d 615, 627 (N.C. 1996); 
McKinney v. City of Greenville, 203 S.E.2d 680, 690 (S.C. 1974). 
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Most courts that have reviewed the issue of public use under 
state constitutions have adopted a broad interpretation, which is sim-
ilar to the interpretation of the Supreme Court’s public use vein.172 
Indeed, the “consensus of modern legislative and judicial thinking 
[was] to broaden” the public purpose of takings, pursuant to Berman 
and Midkiff, and include economic development.173 As the New Jer-
sey Superior Court explained, “[c]ourts that take the broader and 
more liberal view in sustaining public rights at the expense of prop-
erty rights hold that ‘public use’ is synonymous with ‘public bene-
fit,’ ‘public advantage,’ or ‘public utility.’”174 In New York, the pre-
vailing notion has been to reaffirm the longstanding doctrine of def-
erence to the broad conception.175 Many states also take the position 
that ultimate use by the public is not necessary.176 For example, the 
                                                                                                                            
 172  Pappas, 76 P.3d at 10; see also 2A JULIUS L. SACKMUN, NICHOLS ON EM-
INENT DOMAIN § 7.02[3], at 7-33, 7-36 (Matthew Bender ed., 3d ed. 2017). 
 173  Faulconer v. City of Danville, 232 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Ky. 1950). 
 174  County of Essex v. Hindenlang, 114 A.2d 461, 469 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1955). 
 175  Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721, 730 (N.Y. 2010) 
(reaffirming the longstanding doctrine of legislative deference in New York, 
meaning that so long as the legislature makes rational, nonarbitrary determina-
tions as to blight and public purpose, the judiciary will not substitute its judgment 
for that of the legislative body). 
 176  The majority of state courts take this broader view. See, e.g., Cohen v. Lar-
son, 867 P.2d 956, 958 (Idaho 1993) (“The proposed use need not be strictly pub-
lic, but it must at least benefit the public welfare or the economy of the state. The 
notion of public use is a flexible one depending on the needs and wants of the 
community.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); Green v. High Ridge Ass’n, 
695 A.2d 125, 129 (Md. 1997) (noting that “‘public use’ is not limited to circum-
stances where ‘the public . . . literally or physically [is] permitted to use the prop-
erty taken by eminent domain.’” (omission and alteration in original)); Pappas, 
76 P.3d at 11; Township of West Orange v. 769 Assocs., L.L.C., 800 A.2d 86, 91 
(N.J. 2002) (“[I]t is not essential that the entire community or even any consider-
able portion of the community directly enjoy or participate in the condemned 
property for the taking to constitute a ‘public use.’”); Hindenlang, 114 A.2d at 
468 (“The number of people who will participate in or benefit by the use for which 
the property is to be condemned is not the determinant of whether the use is or is 
not a public one.”); Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co. v. McLeod, 364 S.E.2d 399, 402 
(N.C. 1988) (“[I]t is ‘immaterial’ if the use is limited to citizens of a certain loca-
tion or that few people will in fact exercise the right to use. The key point . . . is 
that the use is ‘open to all who choose to avail themselves of it. The mere fact that 
the advantage of the use inures to a particular individual . . . will not deprive it of 
its public character.’” (citations omitted) (second omission in original) (quoting 
Dyer v. Tex. Elec. Serv. Co., 680 S.W.2d 883, 885 (Tex. App. 1984))); Grice v. 
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Colorado Supreme Court, in Rabinoff v. District Court ex rel. Den-
ver, noted that the Berman decision was persuasive in emphasizing 
that ultimate private ownership does not render a redevelopment 
scheme invalid.177 Similarly, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has 
called Berman the “single greatest contribution to the expanded 
view of” public use doctrine.178 The Idaho Supreme Court has stated 
that Berman has the “near[] universal consensus of the [state] 
courts.”179 As for economic development as a justifiable public use, 
courts have consistently found that the removal of economic stagna-
tion satisfies the public use test under both federal and state consti-
tutions.180 Of course, economic development was rejected by most 
states post-Kelo.181 Eminent domain for economic development pur-
poses became the most recent heavy-handed legislative supplement 
to provide greater constitutional protections than the federal base-
line.182  
As in regulatory takings, there are, of course, exceptions to pub-
lic use conformity. While most state courts rule in accordance with 
the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of the federal Takings 
Clause, there are a few states that still take a narrower approach. 
                                                                                                                            
Vt. Elec. Power Co., 956 A.2d 561, 571 (Vt. 2008) (“It is not necessary to a public 
use that the whole public, or any considerable portion of it, participate in it; the 
use may be, and frequently is, limited to a small locality, and yet be public in a 
constitutional sense.” (quoting Deerfield River Co. v. Wilmington Power & Paper 
Co., 77 A. 862, 864 (Vt. 1910))).  
 177  360 P.2d 114, 124 (Colo. 1961). 
 178  Romeo v. Cranston Redevelopment Agency, 254 A.2d 426, 432 (R.I. 
1969). 
 179  Boise Redevelopment Agency v. Yick Kong Corp., 499 P.2d 575, 579 
(Idaho 1972).  
 180  City of Jamestown v. Leevers Supermarkets, Inc., 552 N.W.2d 365, 369 
(N.D. 1996); see also State ex rel. Tomasic v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Cty., 
962 P.2d 543, 554 (Kan. 1998) (holding that economic development is a valid 
public use); City of Duluth v. State, 390 N.W.2d 757, 767 (Minn. 1986) (finding 
economic development to be a valid public use and noting that “after permitting 
so much new development in the Twin Cities area where an economic boom may 
be said to be in progress, it hardly seems appropriate to apply a more stringent 
rule”); City of Midwest City v. House of Realty, Inc., 100 P.3d 678, 686 (Okla. 
2004) (noting that generally, economic development is valid public use). 
 181  See SOMIN, supra note 168, at 178–79 (discussing bans on economic de-
velopment takings). See infra Part III. 
 182  See Krier & Sterk, supra note 8, at 78 n.171. 
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Some state courts acknowledge that the public use clause in their 
state constitutions offers greater protections than the federal coun-
terpart.183 South Dakota, for example, has consistently offered 
greater protections beyond the federal baseline. Its courts, in inter-
preting the state constitution’s takings clause, have employed the 
“use by the public” test.184 This test requires that there be a “use or 
right of use on the part of the public or some limited portion of it.”185 
Prior to Kelo, only eight states determined that the Takings Clause 
placed stricter limitations above the federal baseline.186 In Bailey v. 
Myers, the Arizona Supreme Court recognized that decisions based 
                                                                                                                            
 183  Lynda J. Oswald, The Role of Deference in Judicial Review of Public Use 
Determinations, 39 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 243, 247–48 (2012). 
 184  Krier v. Dell Rapids Township, 709 N.W.2d 841, 846 (S.D. 2006) (citing 
Benson v. State, 710 N.W.2d 121, 146 (S.D. 2006)).  
 185  Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. E. Sioux Falls Quarry Co., 144 N.W. 724, 728 (S.D. 
1913). 
 186  See Bailey v. Myers, 76 P.3d 898, 901 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (holding tak-
ing of property was not for “public use” pursuant to “significant limitations on the 
power of eminent domain” in Arizona Takings Clause); City of Little Rock v. 
Raines, 411 S.W.2d 486, 494–95 (Ark. 1967) (determining condemnation for the 
purpose of “industrial development” fails to satisfy the state constitutional public 
use limitation); Baycol v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 315 So. 2d 451, 457 (Fla. 1975) 
(construing Florida Constitution’s public use clause as prohibiting the exercise of 
eminent domain for private use); Sw. Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat’l City Envtl., L.L.C., 
768 N.E.2d 1, 7, 11 (Ill. 2002) (holding condemnation for economic development 
alone would not achieve a legitimate public use and was unconstitutional under 
the Illinois Takings Clause which provided that private property shall not be taken 
or damaged for public use without just compensation to its owner); Opinion of 
the Justices, 131 A.2d 904, 907 (Me. 1957) (holding a proposed Maine statute 
authorizing takings for the purpose of “industrial development . . . [for] the bet-
terment of the economy of the city” was an unconstitutional taking for private use 
and not a public purpose under Maine takings clause, providing that “[p]rivate 
property shall not be taken for public uses without just compensation; nor unless 
the public exigencies require it”); County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 
765, 788 (Mich. 2004) (Weaver, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(finding eminent domain for purposes of economic development unconstitutional 
because they do not advance a public use under the Michigan takings clause, 
providing that “[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just 
compensation”); Karesh v. City Council of Charleston, 247 S.E.2d 342, 342–44 
(S.C. 1978) (stating that South Carolina courts expressly adhere to a “strict inter-
pretation” of state Takings Clause restricting the power of eminent domain to the 
taking of private property for “public use”); Somin, Post-Kelo Reform, supra note 
32, at 196 (“The state of Utah banned both economic development takings and 
blight condemnations . . . before Kelo was decided.”).  
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on the federal Constitution and most state constitutions regarding 
“the purposes for which private property may be taken and as to 
what constitutes a public use, are not controlling in this state, and, 
indeed, lend us but little aid.”187 Relatedly, the Washington State 
Supreme Court acknowledged that its public use clause differs from 
the federal one, affording its residents expansive constitutional 
property rights.188 So, while a majority of states have followed Ber-
man’s broad conception of public use, some have departed to pro-
vide property owners more protections from eminent domain.  
This much is known: state courts gravitate toward the same pub-
lic use and regulatory taking analytical frameworks and tests, and 
decline to venture above the constitutional bottom or pull the floor 
of protections a little higher.189 But, do state legislatures that follow 
the Court’s takings doctrine offer greater protections or craft their 
own regulatory takings formulation? While some may attempt to 
craft statutory provisions that divert from or provide greater protec-
tions to constitutional property, most fail to substantively move the 
needle (or pull the floor of protections higher). 
                                                                                                                            
 187  Bailey, 76 P.3d at 903 (quoting Inspiration Consol. Copper Co. v. New 
Keystone Copper Co., 144 P. 227, 278 (Ariz. 1914)). 
 188  State ex rel. Wash. State Convention & Trade Ctr. v. Evans, 966 P.2d 1252, 
1261 (Wash. 1998) (en banc).  
 189  The analyses of state appellate and supreme court decisions is not an ex-
haustive empirical study of state regulatory takings cases. Instead they comprise 
a review of many state appellate and mostly state supreme court rulings, where 
courts faced a regulatory takings challenge and, more often than not, seemed to 
evaluate the claims either under both state and federal takings doctrine simultane-
ously (giving great weight to the Supreme Court’s takings doctrine and tests) or 
exclusively under the federal test (and declining to apply state doctrine). The Ten-
nessee Supreme Court’s opinion in Phillips v. Montgomery County and its cita-
tions to states that conform to and diverge from federal regulatory takings doctrine 
is a useful starting point for understanding the extent of the conformity across the 
states for applying the Court’s regulatory takings doctrine. 442 S.W.3d 233, 240 
n.10 (Tenn. 2014). More research and studies, like the one conducted by James 
Krier and Stewart Sterk, are necessary to fully grasp the extent of the conformity 
argued in this Article. See generally Krier & Sterk, supra note 8. At the very least, 
the case law research illustrates the operation of the general gravitational phenom-
enon of the federal regulatory takings doctrine at the state level.  
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2. STATE LEGISLATURES AND TAKINGS STATUTES 
Frank Michelman and Robert Ellickson have urged state legis-
lators to become more active in shaping takings doctrine.190 Perhaps 
state legislatures are “better able than courts to deal with [takings] 
issues comprehensively” and to “create new procedures.”191 If state 
courts seem to gravitate to the federal takings doctrine, do state leg-
islatures exercise their sovereign independence to enact takings leg-
islation to provide greater protections? The story is mostly the same 
as state courts—conformity.  
Indeed, conformity with regulatory takings doctrine is the norm, 
but it is also evident that there is a genuine lack of interest, willing-
ness, and ability (or failed lobbying) on the part of legislators to fig-
ure out how best to raise the floor on property protections from reg-
ulations.192 For example, in the 1990s, state elected officials began 
enacting property rights protections laws in what has become known 
as the property rights movement aimed at reining in perceived reg-
ulatory excesses.193 At the time, the “regulatory-takings issue” had 
never been “more legislatively salient.”194 By 1997, fifteen states 
adopted takings assessment statutes requiring regulatory agencies to 
prepare an evaluation of state actions and proposed mitigation ef-
                                                                                                                            
 190  Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the 
Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 
1245–57 (1967). 
 191  Robert C. Ellickson, Takings Legislation: A Comment, 20 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 75, 80–81 (1996) [hereinafter, Ellickson, Takings Legislation].  
 192  Kirk Emerson & Charles R. Wise, Statutory Approaches to Regulatory 
Takings: State Property Rights Legislation Issues and Implications for Public Ad-
ministration, 57 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 411, 412–13 (1997) (“Property rights legisla-
tion is being introduced and adopted by the states at a dramatic rate . . . . The 
assessment provisions and the compensation measures present the more distinct 
and creative statutory approaches . . . . The majority of the 36 adopted statutes 
take one of these two forms. However, these statutes are increasingly becoming 
hybrid forms of legislation that combine more than one approach.”).  
 193  See id. Emerson and Wise found that in a five-year period, more than half 
of the fifty states adopted some form of provision for the protection of private 
property rights, and since 1991, property rights legislation was proposed in all 
states. Id. at 412. Their research found 250 bills proposed during that time period, 
approximately 120 of which were introduced in the 1995 session in forty-two state 
legislatures. Id. Twenty-six states have enacted thirty-nine measures since 1991. 
Id.  
 194  Ellickson, Takings Legislation, supra note 191, at 75.  
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forts for actions that might implicate regulatory takings or other vi-
olations.195 A few other states enacted “compensation statutes,” 
which established tests to identify regulatory takings and when they 
rise to the level requiring compensation.196 However, only a handful 
of state legislatures enacted statutes that granted protections greater 
than the federal takings doctrine.197 These few states enacted statutes 
that have turned out to be mostly symbolic; they might, as a matter 
                                                                                                                            
 195  See Mark W. Cordes, Leapfrogging the Constitution: The Rise of State 
Takings Legislation, 24 Ecology L. Q. 187, 204 (1997) (“To date at least fifteen 
states have enacted some type of assessment statute and assessment legislation 
has been introduced in numerous other states in the last several years.”). 
 196  See, e.g, Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act, ch. 95-
181, 1995 Fla. Laws 1652 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 70.001 (2017)); Private Real 
Property Rights Preservation Act, ch. 517, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 3266 (codified 
at TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 2007.001–2007.026 (West 1995)). Compensation 
statutes are analyzed in Recent Legislation, Land-Use Regulation—Compensation 
Statutes—Florida Creates Cause of Action for Compensation of Property Owners 
When Regulation Imposes “Inordinate Burden,” 109 HARV. L. REV. 542 (1995).  
 197  The Mississippi statute applies to any action by the state that “prohibits or 
severely limits the right of an owner to conduct forestry or agricultural activities 
on forest or agricultural land.” MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-33-7(e) (2018). The Loui-
siana statute gives a right of action to “[a]n owner of private agricultural prop-
erty.” LA. STAT. ANN. § 3:3610(A) (2018). The Florida statute is not more expan-
sive than the existing federal constitutional doctrine; it applies to government ac-
tion that “has inordinately burdened an existing use of real property or a vested 
right to a specific use of real property.” FLA. STAT. § 70.001(2) (2018). Texas’s 
statute applies to governmental action that causes “a reduction of at least 25 per-
cent in the market value of the affected private real property.” TEX. GOV’T CODE 
ANN. § 2007.002(5)(B)(ii) (West 2017).  In Arizona, if the enforcement of a land 
use law “reduces the fair market value of the property the owner is entitled to just 
compensation,” but all laws that limit land use “for the protection of the public’s 
health and safety” are exempted. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1134(A)–(B)(1) 
(2018). The Oregon statute exempts regulations “[t]hat restrict or prohibit activi-
ties for the protection of public health and safety.” OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 195.305(3)(b) (West 2018) (originally codified as OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 197.352 (West 2005)). The Oregon statute, which was the result of voter initia-
tives, is an outlier in this group of states to enact symbolic laws providing greater 
protections to landowners in regulatory takings. The Oregon initiatives have had 
impacts on land use within the state. The statute provides that “[i]f a public entity 
enacts one or more land use regulations that restrict the residential use of private 
real property . . . and that reduce the fair market value of the property, then the 
owner of the property shall be entitled to just compensation.” OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 195.305(1) (West 2018).   
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of text, demand compensation where federal regulatory takings doc-
trine does not require it, but they have led to few takings victories.198 
For example, Tennessee enacted a law based on an assessment 
measure specifying the conditions under which a takings judgment 
would be levied against the state for certain regulatory activities.199 
Based on guidelines prepared by the U.S. Attorney General from a 
federal executive order,200 the law, like other state takings legisla-
tion language, is more style than substance.201 It simply states that 
the guidelines for assessing regulatory activity of the state shall be 
based “on current law as articulated by the United States Supreme 
Court and the supreme court of the state.”202 The Tennessee guide-
lines and other property protection laws seem to simply toe the line 
and “restate some of the broad principles stated in the . . . Supreme 
                                                                                                                            
 198  Krier & Sterk, supra note 8, at 78.  
 199  Emerson & Wise, supra note 192, at 414.  
 200  Id. (noting that “most of the assessment laws followed by states are pat-
terned after Executive Order No. 12,630” (citing Exec. Order No. 12,630, 53 Fed. 
Reg. 8,859 (Mar. 18, 1988), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988))). The order re-
quired “federal agencies to analyze policies and actions and to perform a takings 
impact analysis.” Emerson & Wise, supra note 192, at 414. These analyses would 
then be used for decision making in the regulatory review process, ostensibly to 
prevent unnecessary takings and to budget for those actions that necessarily in-
volve takings. Id. “The Attorney General issued guidelines implementing the ex-
ecutive order.” Id.  However, as Emerson and Wise note, the order failed to be-
come fully operational. Id. 
 201  Lynda J. Oswald, Property Rights Legislation and the Police Power, 37 
AM. BUS. L.J. 527, 542–43 n.64 (2000). Tennessee’s statute’s stated purpose is 
“not . . . to enlarge or to reduce the scope of private property protection afforded 
by the constitution of the United States or Tennessee,” but to “provide a mecha-
nism for education of, and consideration by, state agencies and the public regard-
ing what government actions may result in an unconstitutional taking of private 
property,” and requiring that guidelines issued under the statute be based “on cur-
rent law as articulated by the United States Supreme Court and the supreme court 
of Tennessee.” TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 12-1-201–204 (2018). Oswald notes that 
other states seem to mirror the Tennessee language. Oswald, supra, at 542–43 
n.64 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-704 (2017) (ordering the state attorney general 
to develop takings guidelines based on “current law as articulated” by the U.S. 
and state supreme courts); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 24.423 (2018) (ordering the at-
torney general to “develop takings assessment guidelines” based upon “current 
law as articulated” by the United States and state supreme courts)). 
 202  Emerson & Wise, supra note 192, at 414–15; see Oswald, supra note 202, 
at 542–43 n.64. 
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Court [regulatory takings] cases.”203 Additionally, Utah requires 
that state agencies establish and review their guidelines based on 
recent takings cases in an effort “to maintain consistency with court 
rulings.”204  
One notable exception is Idaho, which enacted a property rights 
protections law that involves assessing state regulatory takings; the 
law is significantly more protective than the federal standard.205  The 
law arguably goes “beyond the extant of the Supreme Court [regu-
latory takings] doctrine”206 by prohibiting regulatory actions that 
“result in an unconstitutional taking of private property.”207 But state 
agencies, under the law, are to conduct a takings impact assessment, 
using specified guidelines, prior to taking legal or equitable ac-
tions.208  
Interestingly, there is evidence that states have included local 
governments in some property protection legislation where assess-
ment guidelines have been imposed.209 These statutes, however, also 
encourage local governments to “follow property protections af-
forded by the federal and state constitutions.”210 But, if the statutes 
rehash the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings tests and encourage 
state and local governments to “follow” the tests, then the statutes 
provide little legal significance and function only as symbolic ges-
tures.211 
Even in the context of just compensation legislation, few state 
legislatures have offered protections beyond traditional avenues of 
relief, such as constitutional challenges of inverse condemnation, 
which is when a plaintiff-landowner sues the government for pay-
ment because government actions or regulations fail to pay just com-
pensation. In Mississippi, for example, a property owner can seek 
takings compensation for a state action if the state action reduces 
greater than forty percent (40%) in the fair market value of, among 
                                                                                                                            
 203  Emerson & Wise, supra note 192, at 415. 
 204  UTAH CODE ANN. § 63L-3-201 (LexisNexis 2018).  
 205  Emerson & Wise, supra note 192, at 415.  
 206  Id.; see also Oswald, supra note 202, at 542–43 n.64. 
 207  IDAHO CODE § 67-8003 (2018). 
 208  Emerson & Wise, supra note 192, at 415. 
 209  Id. at 415–16. 
 210  Id. at 416 (emphasis added). 
 211  See id. at 416. 
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other things, personal property rights associated with conducting 
forestry or agricultural activities on the forest or agricultural land.212 
Texas enacted a statute where a compensable taking constitutes 
twenty-five percent (25%) diminution in the market value of private 
property, including groundwater or surface water rights.213 The 
Texas statute goes beyond the constitutional floor “and extends the 
sway of these statutory thresholds considerably.”214 The problem, 
however, with these statutes—which are the exception and not the 
rule—is that they “incorporate some consideration of private prop-
erty rights into existing procedures,” but fail to specify definitions 
and instructions on how to actually quantify the percentage of bur-
densome regulations imposed on private property.215 As Ellickson 
notes, “a percentage threshold poorly reflects the fairness concerns 
that underlie takings law” because state takings clauses aim (but 
usually fail) to prevent horizontal inequity caused by state action 
imposing economic burdens on “a few citizens” rather than dispers-
ing such burdens through the tax system.216 
The latitude afforded to state courts and state legislatures to pro-
tect property rights217 beyond the constitutional bottom is simply not 
bearing out the way the likes of Justice Brandeis218 or Justice Bren-
nan219 would have envisioned. Instead, state actors seem to adhere 
to longstanding Supreme Court takings doctrine to resolve takings 
disputes.220 Why most state actors have resisted the opportunity to 
provide greater protections beyond the federal minima like the Min-
nesota Supreme Court or the Texas state legislature is somewhat un-
clear, but as further explained in Part III, it is probably due to the 
type of property interest at issue and the landowner litigating the 
case.221 
                                                                                                                            
 212  Id. 
 213  Id. 
 214  Id. at 417.  
 215  Id. at 414. 
 216  Ellickson, Takings Legislation, supra note 191, at 82.  
 217  See, e.g., Phillips v. Montgomery County, 442 S.W.3d 233, 242 (Tenn. 
2014).  
 218  See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 420–21 (1922) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
 219  See Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 58, at 491. 
 220  Phillips, 442 S.W.3d at 244. 
 221  See, e.g., Buhmann v. State, 201 P.3d 70, 88–89 (Mont. 2008) (noting that 
the Montana Constitution does not provide any greater constitutional protection 
2018] FEDERALISM, CONVERGENCE, AND DIVERGENCE  181 
 
Like state courts, state legislatures have also tended to draft and 
enact eminent domain statutes to fit the mold of the Court’s public 
use doctrine.222 Prior to the Berman ruling, for example, a “majority 
of states passed redevelopment acts” which authorized local agen-
cies to exercise broad discretion to condemn private property, par-
ticularly for blight and slum clearance for private redevelopment 
purposes.223 What made these statutes, codified in the 1940s, differ-
ent from previous eminent domain legislation is that they departed 
from the rather narrow conception of “public use,” such as takings 
for highways or roads, and instead “required that, after land was set 
aside for public infrastructure, the cleared property be transferred to 
private developers.”224 Some statutes went as far as to expressly 
convince courts of the constitutionality of an eminent domain pro-
vision to give urban renewal projects, for example, priority over 
condemnation for building schools, parks, or other public works.225 
Indeed, the power to condemn was central to many redevelopment 
acts. The District of Columbia Redevelopment Act, which was at 
                                                                                                                            
against the regulatory taking of private property than the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, and thus state courts will not grant more protections 
beyond).  
 222  See ALA. CODE § 11-47-170(b) (2018); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.240 (2017); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §12-1111 (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-1-101(1)(b)(I), 
(2)(b) (2017); FLA. STAT. § 73.014 (2018); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-1-1(1), (9) 
(2018); IDAHO CODE § 7-701A (2018); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 30/5-5-5 (2018); IND. 
CODE §§ 32-24-4.5-1, 7 (2018); IOWA CODE §§ 6A.21, .22 (2018) (prohibiting tak-
ing of property for private use without owner’s consent); KAN. STAT. §§ 26-501a, 
501b(e) (2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.675 (West 2018); ME. STAT. tit. 1, § 
816 (2017); MINN. STAT. § 117.012 (2017); MO. REV. STAT. § 523.271 (2018); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-30-102 (2017); NEV. REV. STAT. § 37.010 (2017); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 162-K:2.IX-a, 205:1-b (2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-18-10, 
60A-10 (2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-503(2a) (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-
15-01 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1.08 (West 2018); OR. REV. STAT. § 35.385 
(2017); 26 PA. CONS. STAT. § 204 (2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 11-7-22.1 
(2018); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102 (2018); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 
2206.001 (West 2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 1-219.1 (2018); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 
16-18-6a (2017); WIS. STAT. § 32.03(6)(b) (2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-26-801 
(2018). 
 223  Pritchett, supra note 158, at 32. 
 224  Id. 
 225  Id. 
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issue in Berman, was a typical example of how other states ex-
panded the public use doctrine within state legislation authorizing 
the expropriation and acquisition of substandard housing and blight 
for redevelopment a “public use.”226  
B. Divergence in Public Use Vein Post-Kelo 
The real puzzle of this Article’s narrative is not conformity. In-
stead, the main crux of this Article is a rare instance of divergence 
that upended the collective understanding of state conformity in tak-
ings doctrine. There is one notable exception where divergence from 
this longstanding gravitational conformity caused a schism in con-
stitutional property—Kelo v. City of New London.227 This centrifu-
gal episode marked a distinct moment in constitutional property that 
has led to a fascinating disequilibrium in takings: regulatory takings 
doctrine has remained immune from a resistance movement at the 
state level, while the public use doctrine has experienced perhaps 
one of the most notable examples of state divergence from federal 
constitutional law.228 
1. THE KELO RULING 
In the five-to-four Kelo decision, the Court upheld economic de-
velopment takings as a justifiable public use.229 Delivering the opin-
ion of the Court, Justice Stevens stated that a long-standing “policy 
of deference to legislative judgments in this field” colored the 
Court’s decision to remain above the fray, and where condemnation 
determinations arise, the Court would defer to the legislature.230 The 
majority took the safe route, noting that courts should not second-
guess local governments’ judgments regarding the efficacy of pro-
posed economic development plans.231 Justice Stevens noted that 
the “needs of society have varied between different parts of the Na-
                                                                                                                            
 226  District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, ch. 736, § 2, 60 Stat. 
790, 790–91 (1946).  
 227  545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 228  See infra Part III. 
 229  Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra note 32, at 2107 (citing Kelo, 545 U.S. 
at 489–90).  
 230  Id. (citing Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480).   
 231  Id. at 2108 (citing Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488–89). 
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tion” and that courts should exercise “great respect” for state legis-
latures and state courts in discerning local public needs.232 Nothing 
about the decision was a surprise, and it was expected that state 
courts would continue to gravitate towards federal public use doc-
trine the same way they had done for decades prior to Kelo.233  
But that is not what happened: state legislatures railed against 
the decision, arguing that economic development was not a justifia-
ble public use.234 But, Justice Stevens’s opinion reminded states that 
they were not tied to the decision.235 He noted that if dissatisfied 
with the decision, state legislatures could amend or state courts 
could interpret their eminent domain laws to offer greater protec-
tions,236 citing the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in County of 
Wayne v. Hathcock237 as an example of a state court bucking the 
trend to invalidate economic development takings.238 States took 
Justice Stevens’s reminder to heart, embarking on a historic cam-
paign of resistance.239 
2. CENTRIFUGAL EPISODE 
Following the Kelo decision, an unprecedented wave of eminent 
domain reform that either barred or restricted economic develop-
ment takings swept the nation. Forty state legislatures amended their 
                                                                                                                            
 232  Kelo, 545 U.S. at 482. 
 233  See supra notes 162–68 and accompanying text for a discussion of how 
states gravitated toward the federal framework.  
 234 See Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra note 32, at 2101–02.  
 235  See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489.  
 236  Id. Justice Stevens noted:  
We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State 
from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings 
power. Indeed, many States already impose “public use” re-
quirements that are stricter than the federal baseline. Some of 
these requirements have been established as a matter of state 
constitutional law, while others are expressed in state eminent 
domain statutes that carefully limit the grounds upon which tak-
ings may be exercised.  
Id.  
 237  684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004). 
 238  Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489 n.22. 
 239  See Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra note 32, at 2103 (calling the backlash 
“massive and unprecedented”).  
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eminent domain statutes to restrict or bar the exercise of eminent 
domain in some capacity.240 Thirty states redefined “public use” and 
“public purpose” to distinguish themselves from the broad economic 
development justifications.241 Eleven other states followed suit, 
amending their state constitutions to be more restrictive on public 
use takings than the federal Constitution and the Supreme Court.242  
This countervailing influence at the state level continued beyond 
the state legislatures and into state courts, albeit to a lesser extent. In 
the three states that did not amend their constitutions or enact re-
strictive legislation, their highest courts ruled to grant greater pro-
tections against takings for private use.243 State courts in seven other 
states with statutory amendments to eminent domain codes ruled to 
impose additional protections beyond the federal public use doc-
trine.244 The South Dakota Supreme Court outright rejected Kelo al-
together, explaining that its constitution offer stricter standards than 
the federal minima by giving “landowners more protection against 
the taking of their property.”245 That court concluded that “public 
use” requires actual use of the condemned property by the govern-
ment or the general public.246  
The Missouri Supreme Court, for example, held that an eco-
nomic development taking was impermissible under its post-Kelo 
statute.247 The Ohio Supreme Court in City of Norwood v. Horney 
favorably referenced the Kelo dissents as more appropriate for inter-
preting the Ohio Constitution’s public use clause, noting “we are not 
bound to follow the U.S. Supreme Court’s determinations of the 
scope of the Public Use Clause in the federal Constitution.”248 And 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Reading Area Water Authority 
                                                                                                                            
 240  Dana Berliner, Looking Back Ten Years After Kelo, 125 YALE L.J. FORUM 
82, 84 (2015) (citing states that amended their eminent domain statutes).  
 241  Id. at 85 (citing states that redefined their statutory language). 
 242  Id. at 84 (citing states that amended their state constitutions). 
 243  Id. at 88. 
 244  Id. 
 245  See Benson v. State, 710 N.W.2d 131, 146 (S.D. 2006). 
 246  Id. at 163. 
 247  State ex rel. Jackson v. Dolan, 398 S.W.3d 472, 481–82 (Mo. 2013). 
 248  City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1136–37, 1140–41 (Ohio 
2006) (holding that economic development is not a public use under the Ohio 
Constitution and also constitutionally limiting the use of redevelopment designa-
tions).  
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v. Schuykill River Greenway Ass’n, relied upon the statutory defini-
tion of public use, noting that the federal public use clause was im-
material to the state’s determination.249 The court noted, “we need 
not decide the constitutional issue because, even if we assume the 
condemnation can pass Fifth-Amendment scrutiny, to be valid it 
must also be statutorily permissible.”250 The Oklahoma Supreme 
Court relied upon its constitutional amendment to the takings clause 
to reject Kelo, noting that to follow Kelo would “blur the line be-
tween ‘public’ and ‘private’ so as to render our constitutional limi-
tations on the power of eminent domain a nullity.”251 Indeed, after 
the Kelo decision, “federalism is alive and well.”252 
3. DISEQUILIBRIUM 
The post-Kelo rupture in federalism was a significant transfor-
mation in constitutional property. While scholars have debated the 
extent of the Kelo “revolution,” the decision nonetheless gave rise 
to an imbalance in federalism and takings doctrine.253 Reform ef-
forts were counterintuitive and unexpected in light of the historical 
                                                                                                                            
 249  100 A.3d 572, 582 (Pa. 2014). 
 250  Id. at 582. The court continued, “[i]n this regard, it may be observed that, 
in the wake of Kelo, the General Assembly enacted PRPA [the Property Rights 
Protection Act], which contains a salient, affirmative prohibition on the taking of 
private property ‘in order to use it for private enterprise.’” Id. (quoting 26 PA. 
CONS. STAT. § 204(a) (2018)).  
 251  Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Muskogee Cty. v. Lowery, 136 P.3d 639, 652 
(Okla. 2006). 
 252  See Horton & Levesque, supra note 161, at 1424. 
 253  Bethany Berger, Kelo and the Constitutional Revolution that Wasn’t, 48 
CONN. L. REV. 1429, 1436 (2016). Bethany Berger cautions against the notion 
that Kelo was a revolution. Id. She argues that economic development takings are 
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ars. Id. She points to the blight loopholes, many of which Ilya Somin has identi-
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impact on the law.” Id.; see Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra note 32, at 2120. 
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of Backlash, supra note 32, at 2102–02. The extent of state action—legislative 
reform, constitutional reform, and state court resistance—was quite astonishing. 
Id. 
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context in which states gravitated towards the Supreme Court’s pub-
lic use jurisprudence on economic development-related takings.254 
The surprise caused by these reform efforts was largely due to the 
history of state following, especially around broad conceptions of 
public use.255 Recall that the Court’s Berman decision corralled 
thirty-four state supreme courts to mimic, adopt, and apply the 
Court’s broad interpretation of public use.256 It was anticipated, 
based on a history of conformity, that after Kelo, states would con-
tinue to write the prevailing public use script and slavishly imitate 
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence much like they did after Berman 
and Midkiff.257 Instead, the very opposite occurred.258 States quickly 
dismissed the Court’s broad conception in the Kelo decision.259 The 
public use doctrine, unlike the regulatory takings doctrine, was sud-
denly anathema.  
This is not to say that the entire public use doctrine was under-
mined or threatened by the post-Kelo, state-level reform. Traditional 
public use takings are permitted in most states.260 But economic de-
velopment of the type opposed by states post-Kelo was often a key 
component of the claimed public use for local governments.261 This 
was indeed a seismic shift from the traditional understanding of fed-
eralism and eminent domain takings.262 While the legislative re-
proach to Kelo was more significant than the judicial, state court 
                                                                                                                            
 254  See supra Section II.B. 
 255  See id. 
 256  See id. 
 257  See id. for a discussion of state conformity in public use doctrine.  
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 260  See Daniel B. Kelly, The “Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain 
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decisions refusing to apply Kelo acted in repudiation of the gravita-
tional force of federal public use doctrine.263 Nonetheless, the Tak-
ings Clause has been ruptured; regulatory takings doctrine and its 
murky analytical frameworks continue to be followed by the major-
ity of state supreme courts and state legislatures, while the post-Kelo 
backlash against a broad interpretation of public use has caused a 
disequilibrium in constitutional property.264  
Why state courts, generally, are reluctant to independently pur-
sue a different doctrinal course than the one offered by the nation’s 
highest court is any one’s guess.265 But, we are not in the business 
of guessing. Instead, the more interesting question is why did states 
abruptly dismiss the Court’s broad conception of public use in Kelo? 
The regulatory takings muddle created by the Court may be pre-
cisely why states prefer to dutifully follow the federal lead. The 
looming prospect of going it alone to carve out a separate doctrine 
beyond the Supreme Court’s confusing doctrinal baseline may be 
too risky or daunting.266 Still, why continue to mimic a doctrinal 
muddle like regulatory takings when most scholars agree that the 
level of anxiety the doctrine generates year in and year out is argu-
ably unnecessary?267 The necessity for analytical and cognitive cre-
ativity to carve a new regulatory takings path (or to simply reject 
                                                                                                                            
administration aided the growth of the property rights movement in the 1980s). 
The inertial resistance against federal public use doctrine was, arguably, begin-
ning to take shape ten years prior to the Kelo decision, where state courts started 
to find that their state constitutions prohibited economic development takings. 
See, e.g., Sw. Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat’l City Envtl., L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1, 9, 11 (Ill. 
2002) (holding that a contribution to positive economic growth was not a public 
use); County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 778–87 (Mich. 2004) (in-
validating economic development takings under the Michigan Constitution); City 
of Bozeman v. Vaniman, 898 P.2d 1208, 1214 (Mont. 1995) (holding that takings 
that transfer private property to private businesses, unless incidental to a public 
project, was not a public use); Ga. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jasper County, 586 S.E.2d 
853, 856 (S.C. 2003) (holding that a substantial projection of economic benefit 
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 263  See supra Section II.B. 
 264  Id. 
 265  Dodson, supra note 1, at 711. 
 266  Id. at 744 (reasoning that the history of state following makes following 
easier and more acceptable). 
 267  See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 957, 981 (calling analysis of the regulatory takings doctrine “anxiety-
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such a claim altogether) is indeed daunting for state courts, so many 
may prefer caution over ambition.268  
Is the disequilibrium, i.e. greater divergence, a result of state 
courts realization that the public use analytical framework is just an 
easier target to diverge from the Court than regulatory takings doc-
trine? The sacrificial lamb, so to speak? Indeed, many will agree that 
the analytical process of determining public use (whether using a 
broad conception or narrow conception) is a much easier task than a 
court or litigant winding its way through confusing, inconsistent and 
arguably needless tests to determine whether government action is a 
“taking” rather than, say, simply a substantive due process concern 
like it was prior to Mahon.269 And, why were there the few instances 
of divergence amidst widespread convergence to federal takings 
doctrine prior to the Kelo rupture? What is it about these few outlier 
state supreme courts that make them so willing and able to depart 
from the high court? More importantly, why is there this historic rift 
post-Kelo? 
4. A POLITICAL ECONOMY EXPLANATION 
Perhaps the reason for disequilibrium in public use rather than 
regulatory takings post-Kelo, boils down to the political economy; 
that is, the specific property interest held by the landowner-chal-
lenger and the electorates perception of underprotections to specific 
forms of property ownership. American law holds the home and 
homeowners to elevated status.270 Indeed, the federal Constitution, 
along with state constitutions and statutory law “recognize the home 
as a special place worth preserving.”271 Ben Barros explains that the 
                                                                                                                            
inducing”); Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 
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 268  See Dodson, supra note 1, at 730, 739. 
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home is “treated more favorably”272 than other types of property. 
This is largely a result, as Margaret Radin explains, of the home be-
ing held as “inextricably part of the individual, the family, and the 
fabric of society.”273 Indeed, the “home occupies a special place in 
the pantheon of constitutional rights.”274 The Supreme Court, like-
wise, has “manifest[ed] a special concern with the protection of the 
home.”275 It makes sense, then, that a crucial Supreme Court ruling 
seemingly disregarding the home and arguably underprotecting the 
locus, specifically Ms. Kelo’s, was enough to arouse the electorates 
collective conception of the home as a special property interest 
worth protecting.276 
Thus, the dichotomy of divergence and convergence post-Kelo 
turns, persuasively, on the profile of the property owner challenging 
a regulation as a taking or condemnation—homeowner or developer. 
Recall Berman and Midkiff. Arguably, neither the plaintiffs nor the 
specific takings involved in those cases were conducive for a state-
level backlash. Why? One view is that the property owners affected 
by eminent domain did not concern an involuntary taking from a 
homeowner.277 In Midkiff, the taking was for the purpose of breaking 
up a land oligopoly where the transfer resulted in rental homes being 
taken from landlords.278 Berman dealt with the exercise of eminent 
domain for urban renewal purposes, and its plaintiff was the owner 
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of a department store for commercial purposes and not to be “used 
as a dwelling or place of habitation.”279 Indeed, a primary consider-
ation in Berman was whether the commercial property owners sub-
ject to condemnation would be permitted to repurchase the land for 
redevelopment in “harmony with the overall plan.”280 In other 
words, a taking of commercial property with the potential for further 
private development at a later date was a primary contention in Ber-
man, not the taking of a single-parcel home.281 While public use 
challenges in state courts did sometimes involve nonhomeowner 
plaintiffs,282 the distinction in commercial development and home-
owner property rights is important here. 
Homeowners’ ability to enjoy and preserve their personal inter-
ests and financial investments in the home and hearth drive a strong 
desire to maintain possession.283 As Jan Cohn notes, “for the vast 
majority of Americans, house and home coexist; home flourishes 
most successfully in the privately owned, detached, single-family 
dwelling.”284 And as Bethany Berger notes, “[a]ll of the plaintiffs 
[in Kelo] shared some characteristics that made them especially easy 
to sell to the media and public . . . [and] tailor-made to appeal to a 
wide swath of Americans.”285 They were white homeowners of sin-
gle-family detached buildings and thus looked like a bastion of “sub-
urban and rural voters.”286 It is here that the distinction between 
homeowners and developers is a persuasive argument for why states 
embarked on divergence from federal public use doctrine, yet re-
main wedded to federal regulatory takings doctrine.  
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While developers are in a position to “diversify their invest-
ment[s]” and are “repeat players” in many jurisdictions, homeown-
ers simply are not.287 For developers, the primary risk of overly bur-
densome regulations is reduction in land value.288 Such conse-
quences are important for overall business and investment across a 
potentially large swath of land within a jurisdiction.289 The extent of 
a developer’s fungible property holdings will probably determine 
whether burdensome regulations actually do impact its bottom 
line.290 However, the primary risk to homeowners is concentrated 
on a single parcel of land. As Krier and Sterk note, this makes “di-
versification” in investments more difficult.291 As Krier and Sterk’s 
research shows, homeowners are much more likely to prevail on tak-
ings claims than developers are in state-level regulatory (or implicit) 
takings challenges.292 
It might simply be that state courts are less sympathetic to de-
velopers in regulatory takings challenges because of their relation-
ship to the underlying property.293 Another explanation is that state 
courts may be more sympathetic to homeowners than developers.294 
Developers, who are ordinarily repeat players in the land use and 
development processes in a particular jurisdiction, probably litigate 
more often (and thus are prone to lose more often) than homeown-
ers, landlords, or even small business owners.295 
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The plaintiffs in almost every major regulatory takings case be-
fore the Supreme Court were hardly the quintessential holders of 
core property rights. In fact, the rights the landowners were advanc-
ing were broad and diverse, yet atypical of societal collective con-
ceptions of core property rights. The plaintiff in Penn Central was 
the Penn Central Transportation Company, which owned Grand 
Central Terminal, a designated landmark protected by a New York 
preservation law.296 Anthony Palazzolo, landowner of beachfront 
property, was denied a permit to develop wetlands, and subse-
quently lost his challenge under a Lucas analysis.297 Yet, his devel-
opment plans were for no ordinary development, and certainly not 
one involving a homeowner. His plans included permits necessary 
to create a private beach club that would include, among other 
things, parking, picnic areas, and barbecue pits.298 Jean Loretto was 
a residential landlord located in the Upper West Side of Manhat-
tan.299 She challenged a statute barring landlords from interfering 
with the installation of cable television facilities.300 This was hardly 
an earth-shattering result that would irk the typical homeowner’s 
conception of private property. David Lucas—owner of two vacant 
oceanfront lots on the Isle of Palms in South Carolina—was also not 
the typical landowner who would be outraged even if the Supreme 
                                                                                                                            
 296  Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1978). 
I leave out the cases Nollan and Dolan since they can be distinguished as exaction 
cases. Yet, those plaintiffs would also be distinguishable from the single-parcel 
traditional homeowner like Ms. Kelo. The plaintiff in Dolan was a landowner who 
applied for, and was denied, a permit to tear down an existing retail building to 
construct a larger one in an effort to increase and intensify the commercial use. 
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 379, 394–96 (1994). The landowners in 
Nollan sought to develop their beachfront lot. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 
483 U.S. 825, 827–28 (1987). The administrative agency decided to deny the per-
mit unless the Nollans allowed people to cross back and forth across the property. 
Id. at 828. This is, again, not a typical story of the average American homeowner.  
 297  Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 613–16, 626–30 (2001) (holding 
title acquisition after effective date of regulation did not preclude regulatory tak-
ings claim). 
 298  Id. at 615. 
 299  Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 485 U.S. 419, 421 
(1982). 
 300  Id. at 419–24, 441. 
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Court had upheld the government regulation outright instead of re-
manding back to state court.301 Further, Lucas’s land was undevel-
oped, and he had yet to build or invest in a single-family home.302 
Had the regulation at issue precluded further construction of existing 
single-family homes, then perhaps states, regardless of the Court’s 
decision to remand, would have been urged to protest the decision 
and diverge from the Lucas test set forth by Justice Scalia. 
Lingle’s plaintiff was an oil company challenging a statute lim-
iting rent charged to dealers leasing company-owned service sta-
tions.303 The plaintiffs in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. 
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency were 400 landowners who were 
threatened by a moratorium on their undeveloped land, not their 
physical homes.304 The landowners lived in one of the nation’s most 
beautiful, scenic, and touristy freshwater lakes in the United 
States.305 At best, the plaintiffs in Tahoe Regional Planning Agency 
come closest to the type of plaintiff that might have triggered a major 
state-level resistance movement. There were, however, enough dif-
ferences between these plaintiffs and Ms. Kelo to make Ms. Kelo 
appear more vulnerable to a physical appropriation when subjected 
to regulations on her property than the hundreds of wealthy individ-
uals who owned undeveloped land near Lake Tahoe. These plaintiff 
landowners’ interests in the land were in some ways distinct from 
typical homeowners. 
The Court’s most recent ruling in Murr v. Wisconsin was in fa-
vor of the government.306 Its narrative probably competes with Ta-
hoe Regional Planning Agency, but it still falls short of the kind of 
ruling that invokes widespread disapproval across the electorate. 
The challengers in Murr were landowners whose use of two lots was 
intertwined in the “parcel as a whole” dispute under a Wisconsin 
county regulation.307 Although the property in dispute was not a sin-
gle-parcel home, a small family cabin was situated on one of the 
lots, and strong familial ties to the lots were central to the use and 
                                                                                                                            
 301  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1008–09, 1031–32 (1992). 
 302  Id. at 1008. 
 303  Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 533 (2005). 
 304  535 U.S. 302, 312 (2002). 
 305  Id. at 307. 
 306  137 S.Ct. 1933, 1950 (2017).  
 307  Id. at 1936, 1949. 
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conveyance of the lots.308 Still, even the Murr narrative lacked the 
political bite and core property rights element that Kelo presented. 
Perhaps it is too soon to tell what impact the local government’s 
victory will have on state actors’ accord with the Court’s doctrine.309 
To understand the importance of these property distinctions, it is 
useful to note the events that led to the property rights movement in 
the 1990s targeting, among other things, regulatory takings. The 
movement targeted perceived government overreach in the regula-
tory arena, specifically environmental regulation.310 This was in re-
sponse to major federal legislation in the 1970s, such as the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act and the National Environ-
mental Policy Act, which arguably limited the rights of landowners 
in ways unfavorable for property rights advocates.311 While federal 
efforts to rein in environmental regulations that purportedly went 
too far were unsuccessful, state legislators were aggressive in their 
pursuit of stricter private property protections from regulation.312 
The property rights movement was largely due to a perception that 
environmental regulations underprotected small landowners.313 
Critics of the movement saw the legislative efforts as an “attack on 
[the] nation’s environmental laws.”314  
                                                                                                                            
 308  Id. at 1940. 
 309  It is worth noting that the reaction to Murr so far has been less extensive 
than that to Kelo, and more split along ideological lines. Compare Ilya Somin, A 
Loss for Property Rights in Murr v. Wisconsin [Updated with a Link to My Re-
sponse to Prof. Rick Hills], WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 23, 2017), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/23/a-loss-
for-property-rights-in-murr-v-wisconsin/?utm_term=.9cd6dcc732e0 (presenting 
from a libertarian perspective concerns that the decision is likely to create “con-
fusion and uncertainty going forward”) with Josh Patashnik, Less than Meets the 
Eye: Murr’s Impact Is Likely Limited, LAW360 (July 3, 2017, 10:29 AM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/940066/less-than-meets-the-eye-murr-s-impact-
is-likely-limited (“[I]t is doubtful that Murr will actually change the outcome in 
many cases.”). 
 310  Nancie G. Marzulla, State Private Property Rights Initiative As a Response 
to “Environmental Takings,” 46 S.C. L. REV. 613, 613–14, 630–33 (1995). 
 311  Id. at 615–22, 633–34 (explaining the rise of environmental regulations at 
the federal, state and local levels, and noting the electoral success of property 
rights advocates in races for the federal and state legislatures). 
 312  Cordes, supra note 195, at 189–90. 
 313  Marzulla, supra note 310, at 614–15. 
 314  John A. Humbach, Should Taxpayers Pay People to Obey Environmental 
Laws?, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 423, 430 (1995).  
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But, there is one common theme that seems to thread these ar-
guments: landownership and the industries that benefit from it—ag-
riculture, farming, ranching, etc.—at the core of the 1990s property 
rights movement. A central issue in the movement to strengthen reg-
ulatory takings doctrine at the state legislative level was to protect 
industries that overwhelmingly benefited from access to potentially 
large landholdings to be used for commercial and agricultural devel-
opment purposes.315 This is in light of the fact that small farmers and 
agriculturalists occupy an extremely small space in the modern 
economy.316 This is a distinction that warrants attention. It would 
seem that the two movements—1990s property rights movement 
and 2005 post-Kelo reform—were seeking to achieve the same re-
sults, ie. greater property protections; however, the results at the 
state levels differed greatly.317  The latter movement expanded prop-
erty protections to homeowners and explicitly diverged from Su-
preme Court takings doctrine, while the former movement barely 
expanded property protections as states, for the most part, remained 
obedient to the federal regulatory takings rubrics.318 
Regulatory takings legislation in the 1990s indicated a prefer-
ence for compensation statutes that protected landowners from land 
use regulations and the imposition of federal takings doctrine as a 
guide to regulatory disputes at the local and state administrative 
level.319 Thus, the movement to redefine and reclaim the regulatory 
takings doctrine garnered the most support from states where land-
ownership is most concentrated and where nonresidential land use 
is disproportionate to residential.320 Indeed, the movement “had lit-
tle to do with protecting [homeowners or] individual landowners,” 
                                                                                                                            
 315  See Eduardo Moisès Peñalver, Is Land Special? The Unjustified Preference 
for Landownership in Regulatory Takings Law, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 227, 263–64 
(2004). 
 316  Id. at 259–60. 
 317  See supra Part II. 
 318  Id. 
 319  See id. for a discussion of state conformity in regulatory takings doctrine 
and public use doctrine.  
 320  Charles Geisler, Ownership: An Overview, 58 RURAL SOC. 532, 539–40 
(1993); see Peñalver, supra note 315, at 263. 
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but instead pushed for legislation that lifted regulations on commer-
cial development.321 
The implications for regulations on developers or landowners of 
undeveloped land versus homeowners are nuanced but telling. Un-
like typical single-parcel homeowners, a developer’s interest in its 
commercial property and undeveloped land is more akin to a fungi-
ble asset.322 The location of property for most homeowners threat-
ened by condemnation makes the home nonfungible.323 The home-
owner is simply less likely to view the asset at the level of fungibility 
as a developer, who may have many properties spread widely within 
and across jurisdictions and localities. Thus, overly burdensome 
land-use regulations that affect several of the developer’s properties 
are inconsequential for the most part when compared to the physical 
expropriation of a single parcel for a homeowner. The developer is 
mobile and portable. She can choose the jurisdictions in which to 
develop based on the regulatory apparatus. Some regulations may 
seem overly burdensome, but the developer may be content and 
willing to absorb some economic loss, so long as substantial portions 
of her properties are not equally burdened by regulation. Such mo-
bility and portability are not so easy for homeowners. 
In other words, the distinction between Kelo’s taking of single-
parcel homes and Penn Central’s regulation of commercial devel-
opment may solve the mystery of state conformity and state re-
sistance in constitutional property. The factual descriptions of pri-
vate property at stake in the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings ju-
risprudence and the reach of the Supreme Court’s decisions, usually 
in favor of the challenger-landowner, did not invoke strong threats 
to the core protections of the home to a level where state legislatures 
or courts felt obliged by political pressure to thwart regulatory tak-
ings doctrine as underprotecting private property.324 
                                                                                                                            
 321  Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A Critical 
Analysis and Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 
509, 529–30 (1998). 
 322  See generally Barros, supra note 272, at 278; Peñalver, supra note 315, at 
253.  
 323  See Barros, supra note 272, at 278–82 (evaluating the personal interest in 
the home).  
 324  This line of thinking might lead some to support heightened review of non-
fungible single-parcel homeowners in both eminent domain and regulatory tak-
ings. See id. at 297–98; Radin, supra note 273, at 1006, 1012–13.  
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In effect, the property rights movement in the regulatory takings 
vein has disproportionately focused on litigating and lobbying for 
more protections to commercial developers and owners of undevel-
oped land.325 As Eduardo Peñalver argues, “it is unsurprising, then, 
that homeowners have not been the forefront of a property-rights 
movement focused on the protection of land.”326 In Lucas, the Court 
carved out an exception to the regulatory takings test,327 thus setting 
forth an implied preference for regulatory takings doctrine that 
serves to mostly protect developers as landowners. Molly McUsic 
also notes that the regulatory takings doctrine greatly favors the no-
tion of protecting land as opposed to other forms of property.328 Ar-
guably, this view extends to favoring land, whether developed or 
undeveloped, over traditional homes. Peter Byrne notes that assets 
other than land receive far less attention and interest under the 
Court’s regulatory takings doctrine.329 This does not mean that per-
sonal property or the typical homeowner cannot benefit from regu-
latory takings protections. The problem is that the Court’s regulatory 
takings doctrine focuses on regulations burdening land and thus 
landowners that bring claims “stand a greater chance of prevailing 
in the Supreme Court” than homeowners.330 And that seems to have 
played out consistently in the “vast majority” of regulatory takings 
cases before the Court,331 whereas regulations affecting homeown-
ers and residential uses seem neglected.  
                                                                                                                            
 325  Peñalver, supra note 315, at 264.  
 326  Id. at 263. As Peñalver points out, the American mythology surrounding 
homeownership offers little support for the Supreme Court’s creation of, say, a 
Lucas categorical rule in land in regulatory takings jurisprudence. Id. at 263 n.196; 
see ALFRED M. OLIVETTI, JR. & JEFF WORSHAM, THIS LAND IS YOUR LAND, THIS 
LAND IS MY LAND: THE PROPERTY RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND REGULATORY TAK-
INGS 38–44 (2003). 
 327  See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029–30 (1992). 
 328  Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and 
Its Impact on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. REV. 605, 647, 653 (1996). 
 329  J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings 
Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89, 90, 127 (1995). 
 330  Peñalver, supra note 315, at 231 (referencing Supreme Court cases dealing 
with regulatory challenges to landowner-developers instead of personal property).  
 331  See id. at 231 n.20 (“Indeed, the vast majority of regulatory takings cases 
in which plaintiffs have prevailed in the Supreme Court have involved suits by 
landowners.”). 
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Indeed, we find that nonresidential and nonhomeownership uses 
of land have dominated the regulatory takings vein of the property 
rights movement.332 In fact, support for the property rights move-
ment is strongest in states that have a concentration of landowner-
ship for nonresidential, mostly commercial purposes.333 This focus 
of the property rights movement “had little to do with protecting in-
dividual landowners,” and instead was about deregulating commer-
cial land use to benefit developers.334 The regulatory takings vein of 
the property rights movement, in other words, seems to have pur-
sued the practical objectives of stalling land use regulations so that 
beneficiaries of the movement, many of whom are commercial de-
velopers—not residential homeowners—can freely and profitably 
exploit the land.335  
As a result of this dichotomy in takings, it is arguably the case 
that states may not engage in a countervailing resistance movement 
against federal regulatory takings doctrine without a seismic ruling 
by the Supreme Court that upholds a regulation that underprotects a 
challenger-homeowner. A lack of homeowner litigants in regulatory 
takings cases at the Supreme Court may be the root of the conform-
ity in regulatory takings jurisprudence and lack of divergence at the 
state level.  
III. CONCEPTUAL AND DOCTRINAL EXPLANATIONS  
Having established core property rights, such as homeowner-
ship, as the origin of the constitutional schism between state conver-
gence in regulatory takings and state divergence in public use doc-
trine post-Kelo, it is important to acknowledge reasons why states, 
prior to Kelo, followed the Supreme Court’s doctrinal script. Fur-
ther, it is equally important to address alternative explanations, be-
yond the political economy, for why states abruptly departed from 
the Court’s longstanding economic development justification for 
public use. 
                                                                                                                            
 332  See Geisler, supra note 320, at 539–40; Kendall & Lord, supra note 321, 
at 529–30; Peñalver, supra note 315, at 231.  
 333  Peñalver, supra note 315, at 263–64 n.201.  
 334  Kendall & Lord, supra note 321, at 529.  
 335  See OLIVETTI & WORSHAM, supra note 326, 37–38 (describing that the 
property rights movement allowed industrial lobbyists to channel public frustra-
tion with governmental regulation for their own commercial benefit).  
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This Part offers some additional explanations for convergence 
and divergence, before contending in Part IV that divergence 
amongst the states and, at times, with Supreme Court takings doc-
trine, is healthy for constitutional property in a federalist regime. 
A. Convergence Account 
On the whole, state courts tend to follow the Court’s public use 
interpretive methodologies, tests, and analytical framework as they 
do for regulatory takings, with the exception of the post-Kelo phe-
nomenon previously discussed. Why toe the vertical line, so to 
speak? In nonpreemptive areas of constitutional law, states are not 
coerced or forced to follow the Supreme Court’s doctrinal rubrics 
and analytical frameworks, so long as they do not underprotect in-
dividual rights below the constitutional baseline. That leaves states 
significant discretion to embark on a new doctrinal and analytical 
path if they so choose. 
A passage from the Tennessee Supreme Court’s ruling on a reg-
ulatory takings claim in Phillips v. Montgomery County offers a few 
clues in explaining the general compliance with takings doctrine and 
lack of divergence at the state level.336 There, the landowner brought 
a regulatory takings claim after the county denied his subdivision 
plat application.337 The court, having previously recognized only 
physical occupation takings and nuisance-like takings, expressly 
acknowledged, for the first time, the existence of a regulatory tak-
ings claim under the Tennessee Constitution.338 Importantly, the 
court noted that the federal Takings Clause encompasses regulatory 
takings to the same extent as the Tennessee constitution, and “[t]o 
hold otherwise would needlessly complicate an already complex 
area of law, increase uncertainty for litigants attempting to bring 
claims under both the federal and state constitutions and place Ten-
nessee at odds with the vast majority of states, nearly all of which 
have already adopted federal takings jurisprudence.”339 The court 
stated that the “textual and historical differences” in the state and 
                                                                                                                            
 336  442 S.W.3d 233 (Tenn. 2014).  
 337  Id. at 236.  
 338  Id. at 243.  
 339  Id. at 244 (emphasis added). 
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federal constitutions are insufficient to depart.340 This passage offers 
a foundation upon which we can explore some of the explanations 
and implications for the gravitational force of the federal takings 
doctrine on state convergence. 
1. SIMPLICITY 
To interpret the federal Takings Clause and its associated doc-
trine differently from other states, as the Tennessee Supreme Court 
found, would “needlessly complicate an already complex area of 
law.”341 It may be the case that state courts will follow the Supreme 
Court’s takings jurisprudence “as a matter of agreement and judg-
ment” to simplify the exercise of reviewing a complex area of prop-
erty law.342 This makes sense to some extent. Takings doctrine is 
complicated and muddled.343 It is perhaps easier to simply concede 
that the Court got the doctrine right and for state courts to try to work 
their way through the muddle by applying the Court’s tests as 
closely as possible, rather than straining for a different, arguably 
more complicated (or feasible), state-level alternative.344 Or, as 
some might argue, the current doctrine is the best we have, so make 
the most of it.345  
Take the Texas Supreme Court as an example. In Hallco Texas, 
Inc. v. McMullen County, the court was inclined to read the federal 
and state takings clauses as “comparable” and that it was appropriate 
to look to federal doctrine for guidance in regulatory takings analy-
sis.346 The Montana Supreme Court, likewise, found comfort in the 
federal script, stating “we have generally looked to federal case law 
for guidance when considering takings claims brought under [the 
state constitution]—a practice that is consistent with that of other 
states with similar or identical language in their state constitu-
tions.”347 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has said that the U.S. 
                                                                                                                            
 340  Id. at 243 (emphasis added) (stating that it “will not interpret a state con-
stitutional provision differently than a similar federal constitutional provision un-
less there are sufficient textual or historical differences”). 
 341  Id. at 244. 
 342  Dodson, supra note 1, at 729. 
 343  Phillips, 442 S.W.3d at 244. 
 344  See Dodson, supra note 1, at 729–30. 
 345  Id. 
 346  221 S.W.3d 50, 56 (Tex. 2007). 
 347  Buhmann v. State, 201 P.3d 70, 85 (Mont. 2008).  
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Supreme Court’s reasoning in Palazzolo348 meant that “[a] similar 
result should follow” in a similar case.349 The Minnesota Supreme 
Court has noted “that the standards set forth in Penn Central provide 
the best analytic framework to determine whether the city’s actions 
resulted in a regulatory taking under the Minnesota Constitution.”350  
In some ways, the simplification of following federal takings 
doctrine presumes federal doctrine is valid. In other words, states 
may simply believe there is a presumption of validity when the Su-
preme Court hands down its newest rendition of confusing rules and 
elements in takings cases.351 Because state actors may simply think 
the Supreme Court tends to get the takings question right, it would 
seem that conformity provides the path of least resistance.352 It may 
just be a little easier to agree “because federal law says so.”353  
2. AVOIDANCE 
Simplicity may also just mean “avoidance.” It may be the case 
that state courts actively avoid the tough and complex methodolog-
ical and analytical questions of federal takings doctrine. It is, per-
haps, just “cognitively easier and simpler” for state courts to avoid 
the big doctrinal questions in a way that would depart from 
longstanding federal doctrine.354 The problem, of course, is that 
avoiding complications in the law and instead just following federal 
law risks state courts legitimacy, making them look like “simple-
minded dependents of their smarter older sibling.”355 In other words, 
might it be the case that state courts truly are intellectually inferior 
to federal courts, especially the Supreme Court, and that the intel-
lectual heavyweights just seem to get the hard questions right? 
                                                                                                                            
 348  Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
 349  Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 799 A.2d 751, 762 (Pa. 
2002). 
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3. CLARITY AND CERTAINTY 
 Like simplicity and avoidance, albeit slightly different, are the 
values of clarity and certainty. As the Phillips court noted, diverging 
from federal doctrine would “increase uncertainty for litigants at-
tempting to bring claims under both the federal and state constitu-
tions.”356 One explanation for complicity in federal takings doctrine 
may be that doing so is a service to landowners—and their law-
yers—litigating the issues. Many lawyers use federal law as a frame-
work “rather than state law in order to take advantage of the national 
application of federal law.”357 Indeed, federal constitutional argu-
ments may cover more ground amongst the states than solely apply-
ing state law.358 Take, for example, the Court’s Berman decision in 
1954,359 which has received extensive citations and references 
where matters of public use were at issue.360 Logically, then, state 
judges may have simply become so accustomed to state lawyers’ 
reliance on federal takings doctrine over time that state courts prefer 
to continue such practices so litigants have certainty. State court 
lawyers, in some ways, are just as “steeped” in the federal doctrine 
as lawyers who litigate in federal court, and will tend to raise and 
address state issues—almost unconsciously—in federal terms.361 
Litigants may find it far more efficient and effective to argue the 
federal angle as opposed to the state angle.362 State courts, then, re-
ciprocate as they become familiar with these federally grounded ar-
guments and tailor their analytical frameworks based largely on fed-
eral doctrine.363  
                                                                                                                            
 356  Phillips v. Montgomery County, 442 S.W.3d 233, 244 (Tenn. 2014). 
 357  Dodson, supra note 1, at 737.  
 358  See WILLIAMS, supra note 85, at 194–95.  
 359  Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
 360  See supra Part II and accompanying text. 
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 362  See Dodson, supra note 1, at 737–38. 
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 The dominance of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in other 
areas of constitutional law has caused questions of state constitu-
tional law “to be filtered almost exclusively through the federal con-
stitutional law perspective.”364 This may be due to a preference for 
clarity and certainty in litigation. Who really wants to travel off the 
beaten path onto a road less travelled when the stakes are so high in 
litigation, particularly in an area as confusing and muddled as regu-
latory takings? As for the public use doctrine, it makes sense, in 
some respects, that a major ruling like Berman that espoused judicial 
deference to legislative determinations on issues so local as condem-
nation would influence state courts to follow the Court’s lead in in-
terpreting takings challenges under the auspice of the Court’s public 
use doctrine. It also seems relevant that state court opinions that do 
diverge from the Supreme Court tend to contain thorough explana-
tions for doing so, while state court decisions that simply follow fed-
eral doctrine may not engage in an extensive discussion of their rea-
soning at all.365  
 Federal public use doctrine, unlike regulatory takings, provides 
a manageable and digestible framework that can be applied equally 
and, arguably, without rivalry among state courts.366 For the states, 
it is sensible and economical to lead with Berman as the baseline 
and piggyback off the broad public use conception because this ap-
proach lessens the resource burdens necessary to blaze a different 
path.367 This strategy bears out in other areas of federal law. Take, 
for example, civil procedure and the longstanding litigation strate-
gies of removing state claims to federal court, or plaintiffs who file 
state-federal cases in federal court.368 The result is that, often times, 
important state-related questions are formulated and presented as 
federal questions by lawyers, which may leave a vacuum of under-
developed state law to be filled at a later date.369  
                                                                                                                            
 364  Williams, Supreme Court’s Shadow, supra note 361, at 403.  
 365  See Dodson, supra note 1, at 711 (noting that a typical state court “tends to 
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4. TEXTUAL AND HISTORICAL DIFFERENCES 
As the Phillips Court noted, the “textual and historical differ-
ences” in the state and federal constitutions were simply not enough 
to seriously decline to follow regulatory takings doctrine.370 Another 
possible takeaway, thus, is that a “general lack of historical records 
on the events and forces that shaped state constitutions creates prob-
lems for [state] judges who wish to develop [new] state law[s]” and 
doctrines.371 It is perhaps necessary for state courts to engage in 
deeper and more meaningful historical and textual practices to go 
beyond the federal minima in takings doctrine.372 This requires, of 
course, the willingness of state courts to take the time to research 
and engage with the historical context of its state constitution.373 
One might argue that “state judges have largely lacked the tools to 
develop an independent body of state constitutional law.”374 How-
ever, despite the lack of historical records regarding state constitu-
tions, “state constitutional history is . . . much more available than 
federal constitutional history.”375 So, why don’t more state courts 
engage in the historical and textual distinctions to formulate a dif-
ferent approach to takings doctrine? 
The Tennessee court’s ruling in Phillips seemed to imply that 
divergence would be acceptable only if the textual and historical 
contexts between the state and federal provisions differed.376 But, of 
course, this requires state courts to actually engage with those tex-
tual and historical differences. The Phillips court did so, noting that 
“[t]he wording” of the state and federal takings clauses are “similar” 
and “no textual variances” suggest the clauses should be interpreted 
                                                                                                                            
 370  Phillips v. Montgomery County, 442 S.W.3d 233, 243–44 (emphasis 
added) (stating that it “will not interpret a state constitutional provision differently 
than a similar federal constitutional provision unless there are sufficient textual or 
historical differences”). 
 371  Michael Esler, State Supreme Court Commitment to State Law, 78 JUDICA-
TURE 25, 31 (1994); see Dodson, supra note 1, at 725 (noting that “states should 
exercise independence in state constitutionalism, relying on the preferences of 
their particular populaces,” but largely do not). 
 372  Jason Mazzone, When the Supreme Court Is Not Supreme, 104 NW. U. L. 
REV. 979, 1060–62 (2010). 
 373  See id. 
 374 Id. at 1061. 
 375  WILLIAMS, supra note 85, at 319.  
 376  Phillips v. Montgomery County, 442 S.W.3d 233, 243 (Tenn. 2014).  
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differently.377 It is of note, however, that the court in Phillips was 
first faced with the question of whether a regulatory takings frame-
work even existed under Tennessee constitutional law.378 So, one 
would expect the court to venture into the history of its constitu-
tional text to find meaning. 
The Nevada Supreme Court in McCarran International Airport 
v. Sisolak also employed a textual and historical interpretive meth-
odology.379 There, the court first acknowledged “states may expand 
the individual rights of their citizens under state law beyond those 
provided under the Federal Constitution.”380 The court then pro-
ceeded to engage in a textual and historical analysis of the Nevada 
Constitution’s takings clause, concluding that the drafters of the 
document contemplated expansive property rights.381 The dissent 
disagreed with the broad statement that the state takings clause in-
tended to give landowners greater protections than the federal Tak-
ings Clause, noting that such a statement “contradicts over a century 
of precedent” and that the “broad, sweeping holding, without any 
reference to Nevada’s constitutional debates or other significant 
supporting analysis, is unwise and unwarranted.”382 Nonetheless, 
this is not standard interpretive procedure among states analyzing 
takings claims. The vast majority of states seem to simply rely upon 
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and apply the doctrine in lock-
step.383 Might it be the case that the robust state constitutionalism 
and independence envisioned by Justices Brandeis and Brennan will 
require state courts to begin to engage in a textual and historical ap-
proach to analyzing takings claims? 
If, as the proponents of New Federalism insist, independent 
analysis of state constitutions should provide the primary tool for 
constitutional interpretation, then why have the majority of state 
courts and state legislatures preferred to follow the Supreme Court’s 
                                                                                                                            
 377  Id.  
 378  Id. at 243–44. 
 379  137 P.3d 1110, 1121–23 (Nev. 2006). 
 380  Id. at 1126 (quoting State v. Bayard, 71 P.3d 498, 502 (2003)). 
 381  McCarran, 137 P.3d at 1126–27. 
 382  Id. at 1131 (Becker, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part). 
 383  Phillips, 442 S.W.3d at 244. See Section III.B.6 for a discussion of Ala-
bama’s Supreme Court as another example.  
206 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:139 
public use jurisprudence?384 Louisiana is a leading state (although 
enveloped by its civil code) for those seeking an example of inde-
pendent analysis of the state constitution.385 In considering an issue 
involving the eminent domain provisions of the state constitution in 
State Department of Transportation and Development v. Dietrich,386 
the Louisiana Supreme Court engaged in an interpretive and analyt-
ical methodology that considered “the text of the . . . provi-
sion . . . , that provision’s predecessor in the previous constitution, 
and some judicial precedent relevant to the construction of the pro-
vision.”387 But the ruling makes no mention of the Fifth Amend-
ment’s Takings Clause or the Supreme Court’s eminent domain doc-
trine.388 As James Gardner notes, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
provides some guidance to participants in the legal 
system concerning the proper way to talk about the 
meaning of the constitution; presumably, a litigant 
will be able in a future case to craft an argument, if 
one is available, based on the text of a provision of 
the current constitution and its counterpart in the pre-
vious constitution.389 
Additionally, the Indiana Supreme Court held in State v. Kimco 
of Evansville, Inc. that condemnation of a shopping center owner’s 
property for reconfiguration of a road did not constitute a compen-
sable taking.390 The court noted that the state and federal takings 
clauses are “textually indistinguishable and are to be analyzed iden-
tically,” allowing the court to harmonize its state takings doctrine 
with the federal approach spelled out in Lingle and Penn Central.391 
Indeed, where a state court finds no textual differences, it is more 
likely to follow the trodden path of the Supreme Court’s doctrine.392 
                                                                                                                            
 384  See infra Section IV.C for a discussion of New Federalism.  
 385  See, e.g., State Dep’t of Transp. & Dev. v. Dietrich, 555 So. 2d 1355, 1358 
(La. 1990); Gardner, Failed Discourse, supra note 80, at 799.  
 386  Dietrich, 555 So. 2d at 1356. 
 387  Gardner, Failed Discourse, supra note 80, at 799 (citing Dietrich, 555 So. 
2d at 1358–59).  
 388  See Dietrich, 555 So. 2d 1356–60. 
 389  Gardner, Failed Discourse, supra note 80, at 799.  
 390  Id. at 208.  
 391  Id. at 210–11. 
 392  Dodson, supra note 1, at 711. 
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5. VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL UNIFORMITY 
Another explanation for state courts’ reluctance to diverge from 
federal doctrine is that such a path would place a state “at odds with 
the vast majority of states, nearly all of which have already adopted 
federal takings jurisprudence.”393 This raises the concepts of vertical 
and horizontal uniformity.394 Vertical uniformity involves state 
courts and state legislatures conforming to federal law because it is 
either the best approach or it enables “states to claim equal footing 
with federal law.”395 Horizontal uniformity, on the other hand, is 
when states across the nation uniformly treat, interpret, and apply 
the federal law and doctrine the same.396  
As Dodson explains, “[a]n obvious rationale for state following 
is to reap the benefits of uniformity.”397 In other words, uniform in-
terpretation and application of federal takings doctrine may give the 
impression that institutions have legitimacy.398 Horizontal uni-
formity seemed to be a major consideration for the Phillips court in 
determining whether to decline to follow the federal takings doc-
trine. The court there seemed to confirm its fidelity to horizontal  
and vertical uniformity in holding that the state takings clause en-
compasses regulatory takings to the same extent as the federal pro-
vision, and that such an alternative finding would otherwise be at 
“odds” with the rest of the nation.399 State courts, like the Tennessee 
Supreme Court, may be doing this because it offers predictability 
within particular geographic areas.400 This is not hard to imagine 
given the local nature of property disputes.  
Property disputes involving regulations are inherently local 
given the nature of background legal principles that underlie takings 
                                                                                                                            
 393  Phillips v. Montgomery County, 442 S.W.3d 233, 244 (Tenn. 2014). 
 394  Dodson, supra note 1, at 732–35. 
 395  Id. at 736. 
 396  Id. at 733 (citing Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1794–96 (2005)). 
 397  Dodson, supra note 1, at 732.  
 398  Id. at 732 (citing Fallon, supra note 363, at 1794–96). 
 399  Phillips v. Montgomery County, 442 S.W.3d 233, 244 (Tenn. 2014). 
 400  See Dodson, supra note 1, at 733. Dodson makes reference to these vertical 
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applies to substantive areas of constitutional law. Id. at 736. 
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jurisprudence.401 Uniformity in the complex area of regulatory tak-
ings may help mask some of the underlying anxieties of jurists, liti-
gants, and the public that regulations threaten to economically de-
prive a landowner’s use of property. The Phillips court’s concern of 
dissimilarity and disuniformity may also be an effort to provide 
“simplicity, clarity, and efficiency by reducing [or avoiding] varia-
tion” amongst jurisdictions, as well as amongst state trial and state 
appellate courts.402 Recall, Phillips is a state supreme court ruling 
setting forth the state’s adherence to the federal regulatory takings 
doctrine in the absence of an identifiable state equivalent.403  
This may help give the impression that state courts across and 
within jurisdictions unanimously agree on the direction in which the 
federal takings doctrine is taking them and are applying it consist-
ently.404 Indeed, vertical uniformity may give state courts legitimacy 
when applying takings doctrine from the top down, while horizontal 
uniformity may give state courts further legitimacy by engaging in 
interpretive methodologies that would result in consistent applica-
tions of the federal takings doctrine across state jurisdictions.405 
Divergence from federal doctrine, in other words, would produce 
much “confusion and instability.”406 As the argument goes, 
“landowners . . . deserve the same basic protections under well-
settled eminent domain law afforded by other jurisdictions.”407  
6. DEMOCRATIC NATURE OF STATE COURTS 
Many state court judges are elected, and the Supreme Court or 
federal law could easily overturn their decisions.408 Thus, it might 
                                                                                                                            
 401  See supra Part II. 
 402  See Dodson, supra note 1, at 733. 
 403  Phillips, 442 S.W.3d at 244. 
 404  See Dodson, supra note 1, at 733.  
 405  See Dodson, supra note 1, at 732–33. 
 406  Town of Gurley v. M & N Materials, Inc., 143 So. 3d 1, 55 (Ala. 2012) 
(Bryan, J., concurring in the result in case no. 1110439 and dissenting in case no. 
1110507). 
 407  Id. at 57. 
 408  Dodson, supra note 1, at 740.  
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be better for state judges to be safe and follow federal takings doc-
trine rather than risk being overturned.409 The risk of nullity or re-
versal is high.410 Wayne Logan argues that state court judges will 
adopt rights-restrictive positions, because such positions are the 
“safest.”411 Conforming to the Supreme Court’s takings doctrine 
may also result in state courts shifting responsibility of developing 
the doctrine to the high court, instead of dabbling with the difficult 
analytical questions at the state level.412 State courts pre-Kelo may 
have also been aware that high-profile determinations that diverged 
from federal law were more likely to be overruled than the rulings 
that comported with the federal public use doctrine.413 Post-Berman 
decisions that did not depart from the Court’s broad conception may 
have been partly a result of “political cover.”414 
7. THE URBAN RENEWAL MOVEMENT 
Wendell Pritchett has argued that local and state urban elites 
helped reimagine the public use doctrine to promote revitalization 
efforts in the inner cities.415 Local governments sought greater rede-
velopment of the urban core in the early 1900s.416 This was done, in 
part, to protect the business interests of the real estate industry, pro-
gressive reformers, urban planners, and politicians.417 Thus, stake-
holders and interest groups had to concoct a feasible legal interpre-
tation of public use that would persuade both state and federal courts 
to conform to a broad conception of public use.418 This broad con-
ception meant taking private property, oftentimes located in “slums” 
and “blighted areas,” and transferring it to private interests in the 
                                                                                                                            
 409  Id. 
 410  Id. at 739.  
 411  Wayne A. Logan, A House Divided: When State and Lower Federal Courts 
Disagree on Federal Constitutional Rights, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235, 247–
48 n.84 (2014) (quoting Robert E. English, Lawyers in the Station House?, 57 J. 
CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 283, 283 (1966)). 
 412  See Dodson, supra note 1, at 740–41 (noting that state law decisions are 
more likely to be overturned when they deviate from federal law).  
 413  See Williams, Supreme Court’s Shadow, supra note 362, at 381–84.  
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name of a public benefit—the removal of slums which were health 
and safety hazards.419  
This provides a plausible explanation for why state courts—
pressured by local and state political interests in light of the Berman 
decision—were reluctant to divert from the broad conception of 
public use to pursue condemnations for urban renewal purposes.420 
Indeed, urban renewal reshaped the American urban landscape in 
ways that may not have been possible without state courts comply-
ing with a broad conception of public use.421 These relatively innoc-
uous external forces and the lobbying efforts to reimagine the public 
use clause yield strong arguments for the conformity at the state 
level. Indeed, once the Supreme Court weighed in on the issue of 
the exercise of eminent domain to clear slums, one might have ex-
pected state courts to conform to the broad conception because state 
court judges are oftentimes politically accountable for decisions as 
a result of judicial elections.422 Combine this accountability with the 
rapid transformations of the urban core due to urban renewal in 
many American cities, and it becomes clear that state following of 
federal doctrine was essential for reasons perhaps beyond mere doc-
trinal conformity with federal law and uniformity amongst the 
states. The health and well-being of urban centers was at stake. 
The success of developing a broad public use jurisprudence for 
urban renewal in state courts depended upon a comprehensive effort 
of local real estate and housing advocates, which included lobbying 
in state legislatures, litigating claims in state trial courts, and sub-
mitting amicus briefs.423 The urban revitalization movement may 
have made state court following of the broad conception of public 
use all the more necessary. 
8. CUSTOM 
 The Supreme Court’s expansion of federal rights under the Su-
premacy Clause has curtailed state independence in developing their 
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own jurisprudence on a number of substantive issues.424 The Ber-
man decision, however, did not invoke the Supremacy Clause and 
mandate that states must follow the decision; instead, the substance 
of the opinion clearly implied great deference to state and local leg-
islative determinations regarding eminent domain.425 A push for 
greater state independence,426 nonetheless, saw state courts develop 
a habit in the public use provision that ballooned into widespread 
conformity. In other words, over time, the Berman ruling cast a 
“long shadow”427 over state courts and was “extremely influential 
upon state courts,”428 which invariably became custom throughout 
the decades following the decision. The longer states exercised less 
independence from a major Supreme Court ruling, the easier it be-
came to ride the doctrine overtime as a judicial and legislative cus-
tom.429 Takings doctrine, especially public use, became a staple and 
solid foundation for state courts to use in condemnation challenges. 
All this being said, the link in the chain of conformity in takings 
doctrine came loose in the 2005 Kelo decision, causing an abrupt 
resistance to the Court’s public use doctrine.430 As I have argued, 
the most persuasive explanation is the political economy; that is, 
state actors and the electorate perceived the Court’s Kelo ruling as 
an attack on the sanctity of the home.431 But, are there additional 
explanations for general divergence? Indeed, there are.  
                                                                                                                            
 424  See Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 58, at 495 (noting that it was 
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B.  Divergence Account 
Why did Kelo spark a counter-gravitational reaction that up-
ended decades of convergence with federal public use, and specifi-
cally, the economic development branch of Takings Clause doc-
trine? What was so different about Kelo and why has the regulatory 
takings vein not experienced a gravitational resistance at the state 
level? After the Kelo ruling, the majority of states concluded that the 
Supreme Court got it wrong; that economic development justifica-
tions for eminent domain underprotected property owners.432 Such 
widespread resistance was followed by a string of state supreme 
court rulings and state constitutional amendments banning or limit-
ing economic development takings, effectively announcing wide 
state resistance to federal takings law.433 And what about those rare 
episodes of divergence in regulatory takings at the state level amidst 
widespread conformity for decades post-Mahon? What empowered 
those state supreme courts to be willing and able to depart? 
Indeed, we arrived at this unusual episode of post-Kelo diver-
gence in this Article in light of many state courts’ tepidness to depart 
from the doctrines set forth in Berman and Mahon, while many state 
legislatures crafted eminent domain laws to stay within the ambit of 
the Court’s doctrine.434 Prior to Kelo, there were few instances 
where states specifically granted greater protections to private prop-
erty beyond the “constitutional bottom”435 constructed by the Su-
preme Court and contemplated in the Takings Clause.436 Here, we 
embark on additional “explanatory vector[s]”437 for why Kelo 
caused a rupture in conformity in public use doctrine at the state 
level.  
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1.  INFLUENTIAL COUNTERVAILING WAVES 
In Board of County Commissioners of Muskogee County v. Low-
ery, the Oklahoma Supreme Court noted that it was guided by the 
state and federal constitutional takings clauses, especially the state 
takings clause regarding condemnation.438 The court then engaged 
in a brief historical and textual account.439 Relying upon Justice Ste-
vens’s nod to federalism, the court accepted his invitation440 to de-
part from federal doctrine by relying upon its “own special consti-
tutional eminent domain provision,” which provides more protec-
tions above the federal baseline and has a more narrow interpretation 
of public use and public purpose than the Supreme Court.441 Note-
worthy, however, is the court’s acknowledgment that it was joining 
“other jurisdictions” who reached similar state decisions on state 
constitutional grounds, including state legislative action.442  
While the court offered a variety of explanations for departing, 
such as avoiding the possibility that economic development takings 
would “blur the line between ‘public’ and ‘private’” or that the state 
constitution should remain “what [its] framers” intended,443 might 
the departure really be that a countervailing force opposite of con-
vergence was simply too strong (or too irresistible) to pass up? 
While some state courts in other constitutional contexts “erect doc-
trinal barriers” to ensure they follow federal doctrine,444 it is possi-
ble that state courts post-Kelo were constructing similar doctrinal 
hurdles that precluded them from following the Court’s broad con-
ception of public use. The Lowery court’s opinion in many ways 
tracks what state courts post-Berman were doing; that is, go with the 
broad public use interpretation “unless some countervailing force 
enables resistance.”445 Indeed, the Kelo decision, and the negative 
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reaction from other states, may be the countervailing force that ena-
bled other state supreme courts, like Oklahoma’s, to join the re-
sistance. 
2. LEGISLATIVE LOYALTY 
State court divergence post-Kelo may simply be an act of legis-
lative fidelity, as most legislatures imposed greater protections, and 
state supreme courts simply deferred to the legislatures’ judgment, 
even if the state courts agreed with the Supreme Court’s broad in-
terpretation. The Supreme Court of Missouri, shortly after Kelo, 
ruled in favor of a landowner’s challenge to eminent domain, find-
ing an economic development taking invalid.446 But, in doing so, the 
court noted that it “sees no reason at this point to deviate from the 
holding of [Kelo] with regard to the constitutional validity of takings 
for the purpose of economic development,” yet the court proceeded 
to invalidate the economic development taking under its state emi-
nent domain law.447 It seems odd, but legitimate, for a state court, 
amidst a wave of resistance nationwide, to proclaim that “[e]co-
nomic development ‘unquestionably serves a public purpose,’” but 
as a matter of “public policy . . . economic development may not be 
the sole purpose of a taking.”448 As the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania noted in Reading Area Water Authority v. Schuykill River 
Greenway Ass’n, the federal public use clause was immaterial to its 
determination and “we need not decide the constitutional issue be-
cause, even if we assume the [economic development taking] can 
pass Fifth Amendment scrutiny, to be valid it must also be statutorily 
permissible.”449 Indeed, legislative loyalty is a persuasive explana-
tion for deviation from Kelo, even if some state supreme courts ex-
pressly agreed with the Court’s ruling. 
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3. INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE 
Resistance to the federal public use doctrine may have been 
linked to the idea that state actors—especially municipalities and 
state administrative agencies—have superior knowledge and exper-
tise in weighing competing uses of land, and that state legislatures 
were responding to this localist approach to eminent domain by en-
acting statutes.450 The same year that Kelo was decided, the Court 
handed down its decision applying preclusion rules to takings in San 
Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco.451 The Court made 
an interesting through-line in its opinion, stating similarly to Justice 
Stevens’s nod to federalism in Kelo,452 that “state courts undoubt-
edly have more experience than federal courts do in resolving the 
complex factual, technical, and legal questions related to zoning and 
land-use regulations.”453  
This superior institutional competence may be a reason why 
state actors, or non-federal actors, are best positioned to address 
property rights issues.454 Why? Because of state actors’ intimate in-
stitutional knowledge of the land and property rights at the local 
level.455 The resistance to federal public use doctrine may have been 
a message from the states that property and land use disputes arising 
from overly broad definitions of public use are an area in which the 
states should take the lead.456 Roderick “Rick” Hills notes that Kelo 
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“can fairly be characterized as favoring federalism by giving non-
federal officials substantial discretion to define constitutional rights 
that protect private property” because it allows nonfederal actors to 
determine “what constitutes a public use.”457 And, as Sterk notes, 
because state law determines the content of property rights, state 
courts and state legislatures—and by extension local administrative 
agencies and city councils—may have an advantage over federal en-
tities in land use knowledge and expertise.458 However, state actors 
are “insulated from many of the pressures that face local regulators 
and are consequently in a position to police abusive practices” better 
than local or federal actors, especially federal courts.459 
Although eminent domain law itself does not necessarily impli-
cate land use, the exercise of the power of eminent domain is often 
part and parcel of, and has implications for, land use.460 Thus, the 
countervailing resistance to the public use doctrine by the states may 
be the result of the states’ discomfort with federal actors determining 
state and local matters where expertise is lacking. Perhaps state ac-
tors feel that such interpretations do not fit neatly into the local com-
prehensive planning schemes over which state administrative agen-
cies, municipalities, and even trial courts have more institutional 
knowledge and power.  
4. RESISTANCE TO VERTICAL UNIFORMITY 
One popular belief is that states are lured into the orbit of federal 
law because “federal law gets the law right first, and state actors, 
realizing this, follow as a matter of agreement and judgment.”461 Be-
fore the sweeping post-Kelo refutation of the Supreme Court’s pub-
lic use doctrine, states seemed to follow the Court’s precedent “be-
cause federal law says so.”462 Perhaps it was easier to simply follow 
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lockstep rather than “blaze a new trail.”463 But, it may also be the 
case that states post-Kelo learned to value horizontal uniformity 
over vertical uniformity.464 
The potential problem with vertical uniformity, as the states 
post-Kelo may have been implicitly saying, is that “[i]f each state 
pursues intrastate uniformity by following federal law, then state 
law will mimic federal law in all states, stagnating [the arguably pre-
ferred] experimentation and evolution at both the intra- and inter-
state levels.”465 This variation in the law at the state level arguably 
makes vertical uniformity with federal law less appealing because 
following federal law at the state level “may lead to disconnects be-
tween state policies, state law, and state judicial interpretation.”466 
This is somewhat persuasive. As Dodson notes, “uncritical state fol-
lowing of noncontrolling federal law lends credence to the position 
that states are just not as good at being sovereign as the federal gov-
ernment is.”467 This leads to the perception that states prefer to 
“slavishly follow[] . . . federal law without considering state varia-
bles degrad[ing] both state law and state courts.”468 That perception 
was somewhat eviscerated after the Kelo decision. With less uni-
formity in the federal public use doctrine and more uniformity 
across the states, homeowners, in particular, have a menu of juris-
dictions from which to choose for obtaining the greatest protections 
                                                                                                                            
 463  Dodson, supra note 1, at 730.  
 464  See Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Interpretation of Federal 
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218 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:139 
from economic development condemnations.469 In many ways, 
states’ preference for horizontal, rather than vertical, uniformity was 
a nod to the Rehnquist Court’s delegation of “substantial control 
over takings doctrine to the nonfederal governments that are alleg-
edly confined by [the] doctrine.”470 
5. COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM 
Perhaps the post-Kelo abrupt divergence was due to state interest 
in “competitive federalism.”471 Some argue that the post-Kelo re-
sistance was a political and market response to homevoter concerns 
of continued abuses of property rights by eminent domain, and that 
such political sentiment would result in the loss of business and tax-
payers to other jurisdictions that had more protections against emi-
nent domain.472 Ilya Somin rejects this theory in the takings context 
because property owners are unlikely to “vote with their feet” 
against eminent domain or regulatory exactions or takings.473 He ar-
gues that if homevoters move out, they cannot take their land with 
them.474 But underlying the concerns of homevoters—those with 
                                                                                                                            
 469  See Marc Mihaly & Turner Smith, Kelo’s Trail: A Survey of State and Fed-
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opment because a developer dissatisfied with a community’s . . . policy can take 
the project to another jurisdiction that offers better terms.”).  
 473  Somin, Federalism and Property Rights, supra note 472, at 58. 
 474  Id.  
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strong interests and investments in single-parcel homes—are 
longstanding considerations of protections to core property rights.  
6. DISHARMONY 
Strict following of federal doctrine and the Court’s methodolog-
ical and analytical frameworks may cause more confusion in inter-
preting analogous state constitutional provisions.475 For those states 
that have chosen to depart (or remain tethered to their textual and 
historical tradition), the concern is that unequivocal following may 
produce disharmony between two or more provisions covering sim-
ilar protections within a state constitution.476 Take for example the 
Supreme Court of Alabama’s ruling declining to adopt the federal 
regulatory takings doctrine under its state constitution.477 There, the 
court was faced with two similarly worded provisions under the Al-
abama state constitution dealing with takings, neither of which the 
court found to include an analytical angle for regulatory takings.478  
The concurring opinions noted that “[t]o accomplish such an in-
terpretation and apply it in this case . . . the definition of a ‘taking’ 
in [section] 23 must be expanded to something less than an actual 
physical taking.”479 Thus, adherence to the federal rubrics would 
have further confused, rather than clarified, state intraconstitutional 
text and generated disharmony where such disunity is unneces-
sary.480 The real concern for courts, like the Supreme Court of Ala-
bama, is the “inequity” that such “trumping” of one provision over 
the other would create, “essentially” rendering one state constitu-
tional provision “meaningless” and swallowing other provisions to 
merely conform with what is already a confusing doctrine.481 It is 
unclear to what extent this sentiment permeates other state courts. 
Alabama seems to be a true outlier; nonetheless, it is an explanation 
for divergence worth noting.  
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IV. TOWARDS DIVERGENCE 
A. States as Laboratories of Property 
The post-Kelo resistance is an example of state experimentation 
with constitutional property. The almost universal derision of and 
resistance to the Kelo decision at the state level was what Justice 
Brandeis might have envisioned when he wrote that “[i]t is one of 
the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous 
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel 
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the coun-
try.”482 Of course, post-Kelo, it was not just one single courageous 
state, but nearly fifty states that said “no” to the Court’s decision.483 
Kelo, in other words, may have exceeded Brandeis’s expectations 
that states would engage in a certain level of autonomy and sover-
eign independence. 
As part of American property law, the post-Kelo pushback from 
federal public use doctrine may be viewed as an additional example 
of “a giant laboratory in which states vie to develop the most effi-
cient property regime.”484 As Merrill notes, property rights are dif-
ferent around the country, and “[s]tate variation and experimenta-
tion ought to be allowed to flourish.”485 And, as Sterk has noted in 
the regulatory takings context, national conformity is not only im-
possible, but it is also unhealthy for regulating property at the state 
level because state background law differs substantially from juris-
diction to jurisdiction.486 Yet, states have followed the jurisprudence 
lockstep. 
One way to think about state actors taking a more assertive—or 
divergent—role beyond what federal law requires is the discrete 
benefits that only states can offer to their citizenry.487 The very es-
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sence of federalism is the ability for states—and their municipali-
ties—to implement policy on a gradual basis that fits the local cul-
ture.488 Justice Brandeis’s call for innovation at the state level seems 
to be an important background theme in the post-Kelo legislative 
and judicial backlash. States did not agree with the Supreme Court 
and wanted to test an iteration of the public use doctrine different 
from prevailing federal doctrine.489 And many succeeded to curtail 
perceived threats to core property rights.490  
B. Background Principles Are Fertile Ground for Divergence  
The Takings Clause functions to protect owners of private prop-
erty against unlawful invasion and dispossession of their property 
by the state. In this context, “unlawful” means without some public 
use justification and just compensation.491 It follows that the lawful-
ness of a dispossession of a property interest is generally created in 
the first instance by reference to state background property law.492 
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Justice Scalia famously reiterated these principles in his Lucas opin-
ion, explaining that “[a]ny limitation so severe cannot be newly leg-
islated . . . but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that 
background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance 
already place upon land ownership.”493 Property protections derived 
from the federal Takings Clause are dependent on extracanonical 
sources, such as state property rights, that have been created by state 
courts and state legislatures.494 Thus, the “Supreme Court cannot de-
velop a comprehensive national takings standard.”495 State actors 
“are unrepresentative of the nation as a whole” and, therefore, at-
tempts at following a national takings standard could create dishar-
mony, or “disconnects between state policies, state law, and state 
judicial interpretation.”496  As a result, states attempting uniformity 
across the nation and conformity up the vertical ladder risk making 
an already confusing regulatory takings doctrine impossible. Diver-
gence is healthy in our federalist regime, and constitutional property 
is fertile grounds for such parting from federal commands.  
Independent rulemaking by states offers a healthier dose of le-
gitimacy than following lockstep rules established by nine Justices 
from above. Independence is healthy, especially with the muddle of 
regulatory takings. Perhaps independent strokes of genius by state 
supreme courts will influence federal courts, rather than the other 
way around. Constitutional property seems particularly ripe for di-
vergence at the state level given the nature of background state law 
principles involved with property. Further, as noted earlier, the Su-
preme Court in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries took its 
cue on public use from state courts’ interpretations of the Takings 
Clause. In other words, states influenced the Court’s doctrine as 
much as the Court influenced states in other areas of the law. If states 
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diverge from the Court’s rubrics, like they did after Kelo, then per-
haps such cooperation—or “controlled experimentation”—will like-
wise carve out an alternative regulatory takings doctrine that the Su-
preme Court might find persuasive. 497 
States can and should legislate in a manner that diverges from 
analogous constitutional provisions,498 such as expanding property 
protections beyond the federal minima.499 In many cases, it is im-
perative to depart from federal doctrine, as most land use decisions 
are made at the local level and state courts are, for the most part, the 
first line of defense against “overly burdensome land use regula-
tions.”500 But more to the point, attempts at conforming to the 
Court’s doctrinal rubrics may be nothing more than trying to fit a 
square peg in a round hole. 
C.  States’ Embrace of New Federalism in Takings  
Divergence also fits neatly in the broader conceptions of New 
Federalism, a movement spurred by Justice Brennan that urges state 
courts to play a greater role in controlling the protection of constitu-
tional rights by relying on state constitutions as more effective guar-
antors of individual rights than the United States Constitution.501 
Where state courts think protections are inadequate, they can expand 
protections. If legislatures, responding to their electorates’ will, im-
pose new tests for regulations that burden private property, then do-
ing so should be welcomed as a reprieve from arguably failed fed-
eral doctrine. This is a prominent mode of thinking that envisions 
the Republic evolving through a well-refined federalist system.502 
As part of the evolution of federalism, supporters of New Federal-
ism have argued that state constitutions ought to serve as the primary 
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protectors of individual rights, calling on states to provide greater 
protections to individual liberties.503  
Justice Brennan, acknowledging a gravitational influence of the 
federal Constitution, noted that even though state constitutions often 
had similar or even identical language, some state courts occasion-
ally deviated from the Supreme Court’s doctrinal tests.504 Such di-
vergence potentially raises disharmony concerns, as mentioned in 
Part III, because the “meaning between words which are the same 
in both the federal and state constitutions” may garner different anal-
ysis.505 But, as the Supreme Court of Hawaii has noted, “the system 
of federalism envisaged by the United States Constitution tolerates 
such divergence where the result is greater protection of individual 
rights under state law than under federal law.”506 In other words, 
according to Justice Brennan, protections for individual liberties 
were best executed under state constitutional provisions when fed-
eral protection is weakened.507 Justice Brennan even called for state 
judges to critically evaluate federal rulings before applying the fed-
eral courts’ reasoning to their state constitutions.508  
But, as explained, this New Federalism has not necessarily borne 
out in the takings context. The Supreme Court’s takings jurispru-
dence tends to evoke a magnetic force that lures states into its orbit, 
with widespread conformity. Yet, the Kelo backlash is a nod to the 
New Federalism movement, as states resisted the Court’s doctrinal 
precedent and instead embarked on a different path.509 That path has 
led to the transformation of the home into a mainstay reason for po-
litical and doctrinal divergence. It is also the reason why greater pro-
tections have been granted to those who are single-parcel homeown-
ers, as opposed to owners of commercial property or undeveloped 
land.510 
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D.  Are State Courts Moving Towards Divergence? 
Are there signs that a Kelo-like countervailing force departing 
from regulatory takings doctrine is afoot? The prospect of a Kelo-
like countervailing force against the Supreme Court’s regulatory 
muddle might be brewing at the state level. This is a good thing. The 
Phillips court’s concerns that state divergence from federal takings 
doctrine might “increase uncertainty for litigants attempting to bring 
claims under both the federal and state constitutions” may not nec-
essarily bear out at the state level.511 Recall the exploration into rea-
sons why disequilibrium between public use and regulatory takings 
doctrine exists post-Kelo in Part III. It may have something to do 
with the political economy and the profile (and property interest) of 
the litigant bringing the suit against the government. Litigants who 
are homeowners succeed in challenging takings at rates far higher 
than litigants who are developers.512 If state courts are ruling in favor 
of homeowners more often than developers, then an adverse deci-
sion by the Supreme Court that underprotects a homeowner, similar 
to the ruling that underprotected Ms. Kelo, might trigger a diver-
gence in the regulatory vein. Why wouldn’t it?  
A Supreme Court decision rejecting a homeowner’s regulatory 
takings claim in favor of the government would arguably clash with 
state court preferences for favoring plaintiff homeowners over de-
velopers. However, resistance to federal regulatory takings doctrine, 
similar to that experienced under the federal public use doctrine, will 
probably not occur at the state level until a case comes before the 
Supreme Court where the Court’s ruling underprotects a homeowner 
from a regulation. With the right litigant profile and the right story, 
such a case could rupture the state conformity to federal regulatory 
takings like Kelo ruptured federal public use doctrine and economic 
development takings. While very few states have enacted statutes 
that offer more protections from regulatory takings beyond the fed-
eral takings doctrine,513 it is still possible that a regulation that goes 
too far in underprotecting a homeowner could spark a Kelo-like 
backlash.  
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CONCLUSION 
This Article has explored the interplay between state conformity 
and state resistance to federal constitutional property doctrine. This 
phenomenon can be found in both veins of the Takings Clause, 
where a certain force of the federal regulatory takings and public use 
doctrines has led state actors, historically, to uniformly follow and 
apply the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. State actors rarely resisted 
or diverted from the high court’s doctrinal script. However, conver-
gence was disrupted by the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo, which 
caused a countervailing force that resisted the federal public use 
doctrine. The response was counterintuitive in light of the historical 
attraction of the public use doctrine. The result was a seismic rupture 
that caused a disequilibrium in constitutional property. This has cre-
ated a unique distinction in constitutional property where the major-
ity of states have uniformly resisted parts of the federal public use 
doctrine, specifically economic development takings, while contin-
uing to embrace federal regulatory takings jurisprudence lockstep. 
There are a plethora of reasons for why this might be, but the polit-
ical economy is the most persuasive.  
Today, constitutional property lives in a state of disequilibrium. 
Moving forward, it seems that a return to a state of equilibrium may 
require the Supreme Court to hand down a regulatory takings ruling 
that states would perceive to underprotect core property rights of 
homeowners, as opposed to developers, which would trigger a fa-
miliar backlash that might result in major countervailing doctrinal 
and legislative changes at the state level. Time will tell if, or when, 
we see the current gap in constitutional property doctrine close. 
